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I. INTRODUCTION 
Graham v. Fl,orida, 1 the Supreme Court's 2010 decision finding 
a life without parole sentence for a non-homicide crime committed 
by a juvenile "cruel and unusual' ' has rightly been recognized as a 
"watershed."2 A major focus of the extensive commentary on the 
case has been on its application of the "evolving standards of 
decency'' test to a punishment outside of the death penalty, and to 
whether Graham might apply also to adults.3 Equally important 
in Graham, but subject to comparatively less critical attention,4 is 
the central role that the rehabilitative theory of punishment plays 
in its holding both as a matter of rhetoric and as a matter of 
substance. A sentence to imprisonment without the possibility of 
parole for Graham, the Court explained, would foreswear 
"altogether the rehabilitative ideal," which was unacceptable.6
"Life in prison without the possibility of parole," Justice Kennedy 
wrote for the Court, "gives no chance for fulfillment outside prison 
walls, no chance for reconciliation with society, no hope."6 "This," 
1 560 U.S. 48 (2010). 
2 See, e.g., Richard A. Bierschbach, Proportionality and Parole 160 U. PA. L. REV. 1745, 
1746 (2012) (Graham as a "watershed"); id. at n.2 (Graham a "landmark"). 
3 See, e.g., Carol S. Steiker & Jordan M. Steiker, Graham Lets the Sun Shine In: The 
Supreme Court Opens a Window &tween Thio Formerly Walled-Off Approaches to Eighth 
Amendmtnt Proportionality Challenges, 23 FED. SENT'o REP. 79, 7 0 (2010) ("Does 
Graham invite reconsideration of the Court's extraordinary deference embodied in its 
proportionality review or all noncapital sanctions, including term-of-years sentences short or 
life imprisonment[?) . . . Does Graham provide greater protection to adults es well es 
juveniles?"); Rachel E. Barkow, Categorizing Graham, 23 FED. SENT'G REP. 49, 49-61 (2010) 
(asking whether the Court will extend Graham to non-capital cases, end if so, how far); Eva 
S. Nilsen, From Harmelin to Grahem-Ju,lice Kennedy Stakes Out a Path to Proportional
Punishment, 23 FED. SENT'G REP. 67, 67 (2010) (discuB&ing what Graham might mean for 
the future or proportionality analysis and individualized sentencing). 
Other commentators have speculated on whether Graham means the Court is 
abandoning some or all of ita "evolving standards of decency" test. See Youngjae Lee, The 
Purposes of Punishment Test, 23 FED. SENT'O REP. 58, 59-60 (2010) (suggesting that a post• 
Graham framework might make the culpability test the primary test); John F. Stinneford, 
Evolving Away from Euoluing Standards of Decency 23 FED. SENT'o REP. 87, 87 (2010) 
(asserting that Graham and several other recent cases indicate that the Court is 
"prepare[dl to leave the evolving standards of decency test behind''); Ian P. Farrell, 
Abandoning Objective Indicia, 122 YALE L.J. ONLINE 303, 304 (2013) (noting that the 
Court's Miller v. Alabama decision signals that the Court is abandoning an "objective 
indicia analysis"). 
• Bue see infra notes 164, 186-88 and accompanying text. 
6 Graham, 560 U.S. at 74. 
e Id. at 79. 
f 
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he concluded, "the Eighth Amendment does not permit" at least 
when dealing with those under the age of eighteen.7 The state 
must "give defendants like Graham some meaningful opportunity 
to obtain release based on demonstrated maturity and 
rehabilitation. "8
What is rehabilitation, and what does it mean to have it as an 
ideal? Francis Allen in his major work on the subject, The Decline 
of the Rehabilitatiue Ideal (from which Justice Kennedy 
consciously or unconsciously borrowed the phrase9), noted that 
rehabilitation was an inherently complex term, filled with 
ambiguities.10 Moreover, as the title to Allen's book reveals, 
rehabilitation was, as early as the 1970s, being abandoned as a 
primary justification for punishment and viewed with skepticism 
as any part of the justification for punishment.11 Kennedy's use of 
rehabilitation was not merely BUl'prising in the context of a 
Supreme Court opinion, where more attention is usually paid to 
retributive and deterrent theories;12 it was surprising in the 
context of punishment theory and practice more generally. 13 The 
7 Id. 
• Id. at 76 (emphasis added). 
9 The first use seems to be in Francia A. Allen, Criminal Justice, Legal Values and the 
Rehabilitative Ideal, 50 J. CRlM. L., CRIMINOLOGY & POLICE SCI. 226, 226 (1969) (defining 
the "essential points" of this deal). See also FRANCIS A. ALLEN, THE BORDERLAND OF 
CRIMINAL JUSTICE 25--41 (1964) (describing the rehabilitative ideal and analyzing its 
contours); Fred Cohen, Sentencing, Probation, ond the Rehabilitative Ideal: The View from 
Mempa v. Rhay, 47 TEX. L. REV. 1, 35 (1968) (describing the consequences of a 
rehabilitative ideal theory, including, for example, revocation of probation i f  the offender 
does not reintegrate into society). 
10 FRANCIS A. ALLEN, THE DECLINE OF THE REHABilJTATIVE IDEAL 2 (1981) (1'he 
rehabilitative ideal concept requires description and amplification. I t  is not surprising to 
discover that the phrase embraces great complexity and, indeed, encompaeses widely 
different and even conflicting kinds of social policies."); id at 62 ("Ambiguities affiict the 
very notion of  what rehabilitation consists."); see also United States v. Williams, 793 F.3d 
1064, 1066 (7th Cir. 2014) (Posner, J.) ("{C]ritically the defendant misses the ambiguity in 
the term 'rehabilitation' (more precisely, 'correctional rehabilitation') as used in discussions 
of criminal punishment."). 
11 ALLEN, supra note 10, at 5-7 (explaining the nearly "unchallenged sway of  the 
rehabilitative ideal" in the mid,twentieth century and describing ita decline in the 1970s); 
cf. FRANCIS T. CULLEN & KAREN E. GILBERT, REAFFIRMING REHABWTATION 67, 149 (2d ed. 
2013) (explaining the decline of the rehabilitative ideal in the 1970a and arguing that 
current reform measures should reaffirm rehabilitation). 
i i  See e.g., Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 967, 989 (1991) (mentioning rehabilitation 
only in passing, and dismissively). 
13 Casebooks and treatises by and large treat rehabilitation as at best a failure in 
practice and at worst a £ailed ideal. See, e.g., JOSHUA DRESSLER & STEPHEN P. GARVEY, 
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punishment literature and the literature on Graham has not yet 
come to grips with the full implication of the Graham decision 
because it has incompletely understood the meanings of 
"rehabilitation." 14 
This Article gives an overview of the Supreme Court•s 
engagement with the "rehabilitative ideal" in Graham as well as 
two other recent cases. In the first part, I sketch three broad 
models of that ideal: rehabilitation as treatment. rehabilitation as 
training, and rehabilitation as reform. The first, "rehabilitation as 
treatment," is. in its most familiar variant, the most ambitious. I t  
suggests nothing less than a complete overhaul of both the theory 
and practice of criminal justice by redefining crime as a "sickness" 
and punishment as a "cure." 16 I t  is this version that has suffered 
the greatest decline over the past half century even though i t  did 
(at one point) strongly influence Supreme Court doctrine. 16 The 
second model. rehabilitation as training, is less ambitious, and for 
perhaps that reason, has endured as a part of sentencing. 17 I t  too, 
however. has been the object of vigorous critique. The third model, 
rehabilitation as reform, has been prominent in philosophical 
discussions of punishment and less on display in legal doctrine and 
practice. 18 But it is this model that may best explain the use of 
rehabilitative theory in Graham. 19 
The second and third parts of the Article move from 
rehabilitative theory to legal practice. In two cases decided in 
2011, Tapia v. United States20 and Pepper v. United States,21 the 
Supreme Court has considered the use of rehabilitation in 
CASES AND MATERlALS ON CRIMINAL LAW 37 (6th ed. 2012) (''The conventional wisdom ia 
that past effort& to rehabilitate convicted offenders were mostly unsuccessful.;; id. at 38 
("Even assuming that rehabilitative measures work, can you think of any moral objection to 
rehabilitation a11 a justification for imposing puniahment?j. 
u For early efforts to grasp the meaning or Graham which I em indebted to, see generally
Cara H. Drinan, Graham on the Ground, 87 WASH. L.  REV. 51 (2012) and Alice Riatroph,
Hope, Imprisonment, and the Constitution, 23 FED. SENT'G REP. 75 (2010). 
16 See infra Part II.A. 
1e See, e.g., Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241, 248 (1949) ("Reformation and 
rehabilitation of offenders have become important goals of criminal jurisprudence."). 
11 See infra Part ll.B. 
•• See infra Part 11.c. 
11 See infra Part IV.c.
20 131 S. Ct. 2382 (2011). 
21 131 S. Ct. 1229 (2011). 
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sentencing under the Sentencing Reform Act.22 The cases point in 
superficially opposite directions (Tapia opposes rehabilitation as a 
factor to be used in extending a prison term;23 Pepper allows 
consideration of rehabilitation in resentencing24) , but both testify 
to the Court's wrestling with the role (both positive and negative) 
that rehabilitation should have in sentencing. These cases are 
important, but have been almost universally ignored in the 
literature on sentencing.25 Ultimately, they are testament to the 
prevailing anti-rehabilitative trend in both legislative and judicial 
fora. 
The third part of the Article is devoted almost wholly to 
Graham, the first Supreme Court case in decades to rely heavily 
on the rehabilitative theory of punishment in its reasoning. It is 
no exaggeration to say that without depending on rehabilitation, 
the Court could not have concluded the way it did in Graham. 
Rehabilitation is in many ways the key to the Graham opinion, but 
Justice Kennedy's opinion is frustratingly unclear as to what he 
means by rehabilitation or the rehabilitative ideal.28 While some 
elements of Kennedy's opinion imply rehabilitation as treatment, 
and his concern that juveniles in prison have access to vocational 
and education programs suggests rehabilitation as training, the 
best interpretation of rehabilitation in Graham is as a case that 
treats rehabilitation as requiring a kind of moral reform in the 
offender. Understanding better what kind of rehabilitation 
22 Tapia, 131 S. Ct. at 2390; Pepper, 131 S. Ct. at 1247. 
23 See Tapia, 131 S. Ct. at 2391 ("Section 3582(a) precludes sentencing courts from 
imposing or lengthening a prison term to promote an oll'ender's rehabilitation."). 
i• See Pepper, 131 S. Ct. at 1241 ("[A) diatri«:t court may consider evidence of a 
defendant's rehabilitation since his prior sentencing . . . .  "). 
" The main exception is Professor Douglaa Berman's posts on Sentencmg Law and 
Policy. See, e.g., Douglas A. Berman, The Interesting Issues Raised by Tapia, the New 
S C O T U S  Federal Sentencing Case, SENTENCING LAW & POLICY (Dec. 14, 2010, 5:43 PM), 
http://aentencing.typepad.com/sentencing.Jaw _and_policy/20 l 0112/the•interesting-issues•rai 
sed-by-tapia-the•new•scotus-federal-sentencing-caae.html (asserting that "Tapio could be 
the sentencing sleeper of the current SCOTUS term"); Douglas A. Berman, Pepper 
Providing a Bit of Spice to S C O T U S  Sentencing Docket, SENTENCING LAW & POLICY (Aug. 
26, 2010, 9:47 PM), http://sentencing.typepad.com/sentencing_law_and_policy/2010/08/pepp 
er•providing-a-bit-of-spice•to•scotue-sentencing-docket.html (quoting a discussion of the case 
in Marcin Coyle, Brief of the Week: Conflict Over Rehabilitation and Sentencing, NAT'L L.J. 
(Aug. 25, 2010), available at http://www.nationalawjoumal.com/id=l202470986U6?s/retur 
n=20141114140207). 
29 See infra Part IV.A-B (highlighting Graham's discussion of rehabilitation and 
describing its two models of rehabilitation). 
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Kennedy was after in Graham helps us better understand how to 
apply Graham in future cases and shows us the limitations of that 
decision. Graham's model of rehabilitation as reform is in many 
ways a conservative vision (in several senses of that word), but not 
one without potential to change sentencing in ways small and 
large.27 
II. THREE MODELS OF REHABILITATION
Rehabilitation has a long history as a part of punishment 
theory, but my purpose here is not to recount that history. Others 
have done it ably, charting rehabilitation's rise in the mid-
twentieth century and its rapid decline into near irrelevance. 28 
Early rehabilitationists had high hopes that punishment and 
prison could change into something different than they were, but 
those hopes swiftly came crashing down: empiricists questioned 
whether rehabilitation could ever work (offenders sent to prison 
seemed not to benefit from vocational and educational programs: 
when released from prison, they fell back into a life of crime) and 
theorists attacked what they saw as rehabilitation's unappealing 
presuppositions (that prisoners were not evil, but merely "sick" 
and needed to be held indefinitely so they could be "cured" by the 
state). By the 1980s, if not sooner, many were wondering how we 
could have ever thought prison could be a place for rehabilitation 
i ,  See infra Part IV.c (applying this theory to the length of punishments, prison 
conditions, and adults). 
11& See generally ALLEN, supra note 10; KATE STITH & JOSE CABRANES, FEAR OF JUDGING: 
SENTENCING GUIDELINES IN THE FEDERAL COURTS 9-37 (1998) (describing the history or 
Cederal criminal sentencing); Douglas A Berman, Conceptualizing Booker, 38 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 
387 (2006) (locating the Supreme Court's United States 11. Booker decision on sentencing 
guidelines within the history of sentencing rerorm); Meghan J .  Ryan, Science and the New 
Rehabilitation, 2 VA. J. CRIM. L. (Corthcoming 2015), auailable al http://ssm.com/abstract=2 
019368; Michael Vitiello, Rec:011.Sidering Rehabilitation, 65 TuL. L. REV. 1011 (1991). A very 
brief version or the story figures importantly in Justice Roberta's dissent in Miller. See 
Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2478 (2012) ("In this case, there is little doubt about the 
direction or society's evolution: For most or the 20th century, American sentencing practices 
emphasized rehabilitation or the olfender and the availability of parole. But by the 1980's, 
outcry against repeat offenders, broad disaffection with the rehabilitative model, and other 
factors led many legislatures to reduce or eliminate the possibility of parole, imposing 
longer sentences in order to punish criminals and prevent them from committing more 
crimes."). 
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rather than purely a place for suffering and punishment.29 In 
broad outline, the shape of the story should be familiar and parts 
of the history will inevitably creep into my analysis. 
What I want to do here is to isolate three models of the 
rehabilitative ideal which have had particular influence over the 
last one hundred or so years in American law. In order to 
understand why the rehabilitative ideal was in decline, we need to 
be straight that the rehabilitative ideal was not a single thing; it 
was plural. Moreover, some of the rehabilitative models were 
more modest than others and each model came in different 
varieties as well, which also ran from the modest to the ambitious. 
The models are not completely discrete, of course, and at points 
they can blend into one another. Indeed, in some respects, the 
models are not mutually exclusive: one can believe that several 
kinds of rehabilitation can go on at once and that the state should 
he interested in all of them. Nonetheless, I believe they are 
separate enough to be called different "models" because, in rough 
outline, they have distinguishing features and characteristics. 
I start with the model that, in the minds of many, was almost 
thoroughly discredited in theory and that never really took hold in 
practice. At the same time, traces of its influence continue to this 
day.3o 
A. REHABILITATION AS TREATMENT
At its most extreme, the rehabilitative ideal was not merely to 
supplement or revise punishment, it was to replace punishment 
with something else, something more humane. "Crime" and
"punishmentt
, 
were crude, primitive ideas31 and had "no place in
the scientific vocabulary."32 The more rational and enlightened 
perspective was to treat crime as an illness that needed to be 
treated. Jailers and judges were out; doctors and therapists were 
2 9  S u  Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2478 (explaining how by that time, legislatures began reducing 
or eliminating the possibility of parole). 
:,o See infra Part lll.B (discussing Pepper and its relation to certain tenets of 
rehabilitation as treatment). 
31 See Cesare Beccaria, On. Crimes and Punishments, in THEORIES OF PUNISHMENT 118-
21 (Stanley E. Grupp ed., 1971). 
31 Karl Menninger, Therapy, Not Punishment, in PuNISHMENT AND THE DEATH PENALTY 4 7 
(Robert M. Baird & Stuart E. Rosenbaum eds., 1995). 
390 GEORGIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 49:383 
in.33 They had the necessary expertise to guide a person away 
from his criminal, antisocial behavior and to reenter society: they 
could diag n osis the causes of the illness and recommend a course 
of action.34 ''The management of such [penal] institutions must be 
scientific," one rehabilitation as treatment theorist wrote, "and the 
care of their inmates must be scientific, since a grave crime is 
always a manifestation of the pathological condition of the 
individual."36
On the therapeutic version of rehabilitation, crime was most of 
all a signal to the criminological experts that a person needed not 
punishment, but treatment-in the way that a rash or a cold 
might be a sig n al to doctors that care and attention were needed. 36 
How much treatment, and for how long, was up to the expert. 
When treatment was completed, the "prisoner, like the doctor's 
other patients, should emerge . . .  a different person, differently 
equipped, differently functioning, and headed in a different 
direction from when he began the treatment."37 At the limit, i f  the 
offender could not successfully reenter society, experts would be 
able to treat him in a clinical setting to allow him a comfortable 
and protective (if forever confined) existence.38 
The therapeutic ideal of rehabilitation seemed to many t.o be 
naively optimistic in its assumptions39: that the causes of crime 
33 See PRESIDENT'S COMM'N ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND ADMIN. OF JUSTICE, THE 
CHALLENGE OF CRIME IN A FREE SOCIETY 163 (1967) (analogizing criminal offenders t.o 
patients). 
:M See, e.a., Henry Weihofen, Punishment and Treatment: Rehabilitation, in THEORJES OF 
PUNISHMENT, supra note 31, at 26�56 C'Human behavior is the product of antecedent 
causes. These causes can be identified, and i t  is the function of the scientist to discover and 
describe them. Knowledge of the antecedents of human behavior is essential for scientific 
control of that behavior."); Herbert Morris, Persons and Punishment, in THEORIES OF 
PUNISHMENT, supra note 31, at 82-84, 87 (discussing rehabilitation as treatment). 
36 Enrico Ferri, The Positiue School of Criminology: Remedies, in THEORIES OF 
PUNISHMENT, supra note 31, at 236. 
:ie Karl Menninger, The Crime of Punishment: Laue Against Hate, in THEORIES OF 
PUNISHMENT, supra note 31, at 246 ("I would say that according to the prev(a}lent 
understanding of the words, crime is not a disease. Neither is i t  an illness, although I think
i t  should be! I t  should be treated, and i t  could be; but i t  mostly isn't . . . .  "). 
37 Id. at 246-47.
n Id. at 252. 
3 9  See, e.g., Shepard v. Taylor, 656 F.2d 648, 660 (2d Cir. 1977) C'The instant controversy
arises out of the recent tendency to reject the so-called 'rehabilitative ideal' as a relic of an 
earlier, more optimistic, era and to return to traditional criteria of retribution and 
deterrence in punishing juvenile ofrenders.'l 
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could be diagnosed, that a cure could be administered, and that we 
could do away with "punitiveness" of punishment. We are much 
less sanguine now.40 But philosophers and policy-makers 
responding to rehabilitation as treatment at the time (and they 
were legion) saw something much more sinister; they did not 
object to rehabilitation as treatment as impractical. They rejected 
the ideal of rehabilitation as treatment altogether qua ideal.41
They saw a worldview that treated human beings less as agents 
and more as patients who could be hospitalized or imprisoned and 
"treated" indefinitely, not for the safety of society, but supposedly 
"for their own good." 
In addition, there was something dehumanizing about being 
told that your crime was not a free act but instead a sickness. Not 
only was this factually incorrect (criminals had not "come down" 
with anything42), it was dangerous. Novels such as Clockwork 
Orange and One Flew Over the Cuckoo's Nest described the 
frightful implications of a society run by experts where one's 
freedom depended on convincing doctors and nurses that you had 
been successfully "cured."43 There was something simpler and 
clearer, i f  not more ennobling, about saying that one was being 
punished because one deserved it (it was a matter of justice) or 
that society needed to lock you up to protect itself.44 These 
theories did not carry with them the implication that you were 
somehow diseased or sick and in need of a doctor's care. They 
40 See the analysis or the optimism of early rehabilitative theories in ALLEN, supra note 
10, at 12-14. At  the same time, there is a good CBBe to be made tha_!; pockets of the criminal 
justice system still adhere to aome version of the rehabilitation as treatment ideal: drug 
treatment programs, for instance, or those dealing with mentally ill inmates, might have ae 
their goal the care and rehabilitation of offenders. The point in the main text is simply that 
i t  is not the case that the paradigm for the criminal justice system as a whole is 
rehabilitation as treatment. 
41 For powerful philosophical criticism about the assumptions and prescriptions of 
rehabilitation as treatment, see, inter alia, Richard Wasaerstrom, Puni&hment 11. 
Rehabilitation, iii PUNISHMENT AND THE DEATH PENAL'l'Y, supra note 32, at 52; C.S. Lewis,
The Humanitarian Theory of Punishment, in TiiEORIES or PUNISHMENT, supra note 31, at
301; Morrie, supra note 34, at  76. 
42 See, e.g., MARV1N E. FRANKEL, CRIMINAL SENTENCES: LAW WITHOUT ORDER 90 (1973) 
("Many convicted criminals . • . .  are not driven by, or 'acting out,' neurotic or psychotic 
impulses. Instead, they have coldly and deliberately figured the odds . , . .'1. 
43 See generally ANTHONY BURGESS, CLOCKWORK ORANGE (1962); KEN KEsEY, ONE FLEW 
OVER THE CUCKOO'S NEST (1962). For a more philosophical version o£thia worry, see MlCHEL 
FOUCAULT, DISCIPLINE AND PuNISH (Alan Sheridan trans., Vintage Books 2d ed. 1995) (1977). 
u Lewie, supra note 41, at 307-08.
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treated you as a person: rehabilitation as treatment, by contrast, 
was "not a response to a person who is at fault. We respond to an 
individual, not because of what he has done, but because of some 
condition from which he is suffering."45 But a person who has done 
wrong might not be sick; he may have chosen his wrong, and 
treating him as a sick person is insulting, dehumanizing-a denial 
of his status as a free, choosing, being. 
However aggressively rehabilitation as treatment was attacked 
in theory-and it seems clear that in the minds of most people that 
it has been thoroughly defeated-it left its mark on Supreme 
Court doctrine. In the 1949 case Williams v. New York, the 
Supreme Court not only agreed with, but seemed to embrace the 
idea that punishment had to be tailored to the criminal offender, 
or "individualized."46 The idea was straight from the literature on 
rehabilitation as treatment47: the effective diagnosis is one that 
treats the person and his disease; there could be no "one size fits 
all" prescription, because each person's need and propensity for 
rehabilitation differed.48 The statute at issue in the case, the 
Court said, "emphasize(d] a prevalent modern philosophy of 
penology that the punishment should fit the offender and not 
merely the crime."49 ''The belief no longer prevails," the Court 
announced, as if ringing out an older, less enlightened era, "that 
every offense in a like legal categocy calls for an identical 
punishment without regard to the past life and habits of a 
particular offender."60 
Moreover. for rehabilitation as treatment, the prescription 
should be made by an expert, using all the relevant information 
the expert could gather, taking into consideration "not only static 
◄& Morris, supra note 34, at 83. 
•• See Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241, 247 (1949) (recognizing "modem concepts 
individualizing puniehmentj; see also Greenholt;,; v. Inmates of the Neb. Penal & Corr. 
Complex, 442 U.S. 1, 8 (1979) (explaining that the judge should make a decision that is 
"best both for the individual inmate and for the community"); United States v. Grayson, 438 
U.S. 41, 49 (1978) (approving Williams'e reasoning). I am indebted to Berman's account of 
these casea in the discussion that follows. See Berman, supra note 28, at 388-93. 
◄1 See Weihofen, supra note 34, at 257 ("A rehabilitative approach is necessarily an 
individual approach.j. 
48 See id. ("Not every person whose conduct is deemed criminal is in need of 
rehabilitation. j .  
41 Williams, 337 U.S. at 247. 
IO Id. 
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and presently observable factors, but dynamic and historical 
factors, and factors of environmental interaction and change."61 
The expert would look "into the future for correction, re-education, 
and prevention."52 For the Supreme Court, the experts were 
sentencing judges and parole officers, 53 and in Williams, the Court 
maintained that the judge had to have access to a full sentencing 
report (which would include, but would not be limited to, 
information about the crime for which the offender was being 
punished) in order to make a suitable recommendation as to 
punishment.54 The report would include "information about the 
convicted person's past life, health, habits, conduct, and mental 
and moral propensities."05 
The Court underlined that the reason why the judge needed 
this information was so that he could recommend a punishment 
that would best serve to rehabilitate and reform him. "[A] strong 
motivating force" for individualizing punishment, the Court wrote, 
''has been the belief that by careful study of the lives and 
personalities of convicted offenders many could be less severely 
punished and restored sooner to complete freedom and useful 
citizenship."56 In a footnote, the Court favorably cited a prominent 
rehabilitation as treatment proponent57 and declared in the text of 
51 Menninger, supra note 32, at 46. 
62 Id. 
"' In the pure rehabilitation as treatment model, judges would eventually surrender the 
sentencing role entirely to experts. See id. at 4 7 ("Intelli g ent jud g es all over the country are 
increasingly surrendering the onerous responsibility of deciding in advance what a man's 
conduct will be in a prison and how rapidly his wicked impulses will evaporate there.j; 
STITH & CABRANES, supra note 28, at 20 rAdvocates of the rehabilitative ideal would have 
preferred less judicial authority over sentences and even greater authority conferred on 
parole officials."). Judges with full information (e.g., what was contained in a pre• 
sentencing report) were a second-best option. See Mennin g e r, supra note 36, at 244 ("The 
consistent use of a diagnostic clinic would enable trained workers to lay what they can learn 
about an offender before the judge who would know best how to implement the 
recommendation."); Sheldon Glueck, Principlea of a Rational Penal Code, in THEORIES OF 
PUNISHMENT, supra note 31, at 279 (asserting that rehabilitation must be based upon a 
complete scientific understanding of each offender). 
54 Williams, 337 U.S. at 249-60.
" Id. at 245. 
51 Id. at 249. 
6T See id. at 248 n.13 ("It should be obvious that a proper [sentencing! . . .  involves a
study of each case upon an individual basis . . . .  Is the criminal a man so constituted and so 
habituated to war upon society that there is little or no real hope that he ever can be 
anything other than a menace to society-or is he obviously amenable to reformation?" 
(quoting JOSEPH N. ULMAN, The Trial Judge's Dilemma: A Judges's View, in PROBATION 
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the opinion that "[r]etribution is no longer the dominant objective 
of the criminal law. Reformation and rehabilitation of offenders 
have become important goals of criminal jurisprudence."6 8  In 
order to serve the goals of rehabilitation and reform by 
individually tailoring sentences, judges needed to have the 
freedom to range beyond facts about the offense. 59 The Supreme 
Court in Williams was signing on, at least in part, to the 
rehabilitation as treatment program.6 0  I t  would reaffirm its 
support again over the years. s1 
The fact that Williams tied individualization in sentencing to 
rehabilitative goals is important, because individualization is not 
intrinsically tied to rehabilitation. Individual tailoring can be 
backward-looking and retributive or forward-looking and 
rehabilitative. I f  the judge is looking at details about the offender 
(details which may even be beyond the crime of which he was 
convicted) to find out what he deserves as his punishment, then 
the judge's individualizing is backward-looking: he is trying to fit 
the offender to the right amount of deserved retributive 
punishment. The Court has used this model in recent cases, 
including one involving juvenile sentencing.62 
But i f  the judge is using those same details to determine how 
much rehabilitation the offender needs-as well as his fitness for 
rehabilitation-the judge's individualizing is forward-looking. He 
is trying to fit the offender to the right kind of "cure," given the 
AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE 113 (Sheldon Glueck ed., 1933))). 
N Id. at 248. 
n See United States v. Grayson, 438 U.S. 46, 46 (1978) (addreasing the need for 
"informed judgments" concerning an offender's potential for rehabilitation). I t  seems 
somewhat ironic that the Court in Williams waa affirming a dealh sentence, justified along 
rehabilitative lines. But i t  may be that some are beyond rehabilitation, and so deserve 
death. I t  may also be that death could induce some to reform, at least in the short time that 
they have left. 
60 See TAMASAK WICHARAYA, SIMPLE THEORY, HARD REALITY: THE IMPACT OF 
SENTENCING REFORMS ON COURTS, PRISONS, AND CRIME 30 (1996) ("Penal policy in the 
therapeutic state was even endorsed by the United States Supreme Court.'); Berman, supra 
note 28, at 389 ("In 1949, the Supreme Court constitutionally approved [the rehabilitative] 
approach to sentencing in Williams . . . .  "). 
11 See, e.g., Greenholtz v. lnrnatex of the Neb. Penal & Corr. Complex, 442 U.S. 1, 8
(1979); Grayson, 438 U.S. at 49; see also Berman, supra note 28, at 391-93 (describing 
Grayson and Greenhollz in which the Supreme Court reaffirmed the coMection between 
individualization and rehabilitation). 
82 See Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2465, 2467-69 (2012). 
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offender's situation. It was with this kind of ideal in mind that the 
Williams Court favorably· cited rehabilitation as a goal of 
punishment. It is evident, too, in the Court's emphasis on the 
judge not just finding a just punishment, but also an "enlightened" 
one, and helps explain why the judge needed information that 
went beyond the information supplied by the guilty verdict.63 
Individual tailoring for rehabilitation lies somewhere on a 
continuum between individualization for retribution 
(individualization that is backward-looking) and the rehabilitation 
as treatment model's ideal, which is fully indefinite sentences and 
not merely indeterminate ones. 64 On the rehabilitation as 
treatment model, it is not enough to simply make a prospective 
judgment about someone's ability to be cured, but an ongoing one. 
The sentence must be continually reevaluated, and "the convicted 
offender would be detained indefinitely pending a decision as to 
whether and how and when to reintroduce him successfully into 
society."66 Those who are cured can be released; for those who do 
not respond to treatment, we must provide for their "indefinitely 
continued confinement."66 The experts in the rehabilitation as 
treatment model could not be tied to any guidelines or other 
limitations as to how long sentences could be. 
B. REHABILITATION AS TRAINING
The more aggressive proponents of rehabilitation as treatment
wanted a paradigm shift in how we thought of crime and 
punishment, a shift that the Supreme Court at least partially 
endorsed in Williams and its progeny.67 At the limit, the shift led 
e.1 Williams, 337 U.S. at 260-51.
64 By indefmite sentencing, I mean to indicate an in-principle indefinite sentence; an
indeterminate sentence can be confined within a specific range, or be subject to a maximum. 
See Glueck, supra note 53, at 291 ( � e  present 'indeterminate sentence' is indeterminate 
only within maximum-minimum limits or embraces variations of this principle."); U11ited 
States v. Watt!\, 519 U.S. 148, 165 (1997) (Stevena, J., dissenting) (aaaerting that Williams 
was a case that udealt with the exercise of the sentencing judge's discretion within the 
range authorized by law, rather than with rules defining the range within which discretion 
may be exercised'1. 
66 Menninger, supra note 32, st 44; see also Ferri, supra note 35, at 236 ('We mai11tain 
that congenital or pathological criminals caMot be locked up for a definite term in any 
institution, but should remain there until they are adapted for the normal life of society."). 
61 Menninger, supra note 32, at 46. 
87 See supra Part II.A (discussing the theory of rehabilitation as treatment).
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many to wonder whether rehabilitation as treatment was a theory 
of punishment at all, and instead was a theory of what to put in 
place of punishment. 6 8
But rehabilitation has over the years also taken on a more hum-
drum connotation, which is far from the radical ambition of 
rehabilitation as treatment. What I will call "rehabilitation as 
training'' emphasized not a cure for crime, but rather piecemeal 
efforts at the betterment of inmates through vocational training 
and education or by drug treatment. The goal was not that the 
inmate be totally healed of his criminological tendencies (whatever 
that would mean), but that he become more fit to reenter society 
as a productive and contributing member. He would be prepared 
to find a job upon release, or be able to enter and maintain a stable 
relationship, or simply be more equipped to cope with day-to-day 
life. For juvenile offenders, such programs could include "trade 
training in metal and woodwork . . .  summer camp with work and 
recreational programs which keep the boys out of doors . . .  [and] 
agriculture and stock raising."69 More typically, it could include 
high school or college classes, or vocational skills training. 
Sentences on the rehabilitation as training view, like those 
made according to the rehabilitation as treatment view, still would 
need to be individualized, to an extent. We would need to discover 
what training programs would be appropriate for the offender, and 
this required having a particularized knowledge of his background 
and his capacities. The rehabilitation as training model, in short, 
kept the focus on individualized punishment for the benefit of the 
offender but shifted the form of rehabilitation from therapy and 
treatment to training. The training might be expected to make the 
defendant a productive member of society, or at least get him to 
stop committing crimes (or, preferably both). 70 It did not involve 
11 See WAYNER. LAFAVE, CRIMINAL LAW 28 (5th ed. 2010) ("It is perhaps not entirely 
correct to call this treatment 'punishment,' as the emphasis is away Crom making him suffer 
and in the direction of making his life better and more pleasant.'1. 
61 United States v. Won Cho, 730 F.2d 1260, 1275 (9th Cir. 1984) ("In enacting the Youth 
Corrections Act of 1950, Congress envisioned a rehabilitative program that included 'trade 
training in metal and woodwork . . .  summer camp with work and recreational programs 
which keep the boys out of doors . . .  (andJ agriculture and stock raising.' " (quoting H.R. 
REP. No. 81-2979 (1950), reprinted in 1950 U.S.C.C.S. 3983, 3987)). 
70 United States v. Williams, 739 F.3d 1064, 1065-66 (7th Cir. 2014) (observing that 
rehabilitation "often has rather utopian overtones--easing the defendant's transition to 
community life, making him a productive, law-abiding member of society . . . .  A more 
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treating him as a patient in any sustained way: even the person in 
drug treatment was not "sick;' but just needed help getting on his 
feet.71 
Nearly all versions of rehabilitation as training had their wings 
clipped in the second half of the twentieth century. In a hugely 
influential essay, 72 Robert Martinson surveyed over 200 studies 
regarding the effects of various training programs in prison. 73 
What he found was that, in the phrase that was to become famous, 
"nothing work[ed]": no training program seemed to be effective in 
decreasing recidivism rates.74 "With few and isolated exceptions," 
Martinson wrote, "the rehabilitative efforts that have been 
reported so far have had no appreciable effect on recidivism."76 If 
the goal of training was to get inmates to be able t o  deal 
successfully in the real world, then the failure t o  prevent 
recidivism was a serious indictment of rehabilitation as training.76 
It meant that time in training programs was doing nothing to curb 
the behavior that got offenders in trouble in the first place.77 
Prison with rehabilitation thrown in was not making anyone 
better and prison might have even been making them worse.78 
modest conception of rehabilitation, however, is that a defendant is rehabilitated when he 
ceases commitling crimes, at least crimes of the gravity of the crime for which he was 
convicted, whether or not he becomes a productive member of society.;. 
71 This assumption provides the background for the Tapia decision. See infra Part ill.A; see 
also Powell v. Texas 392 U.S. 514,535 (1968) (rejecting the idea of alcoholism as a "disease;. 
72 There ia considerable debate over whether the inDuence of this essay is justified and 
whether the essay truly did conclude what people said i t  did; that i t  did have an influence, 
and that its influence contributed to the decline of the rehabilitative ideal, is nearly 
undisputed. See Erik Luna, Punishment Theory, Holism, and tM Procedural Conception of 
Reswratiue Justice, 2003 UTAH L. REV. 205, 201 n.16 (discussing the influence of 
Martinson's work and reactione to it). 
n Robert Martinson, What Wor.u?-Questions and Answers About Prison. Reform, 35 
PUB. [NT. 22, 24-25 (1974) (explaining the methodology of his survey). 
74 Id. at 48; ree also ALLEN, supra note 10, at 57 (describing the influence of Martinson's 
conclusion). 
76 Martinson, supra note 73, at 25 (emphasis omitted). 
71 See id. at 49 (explaining that the author's findings offer "very little re880n to hope that
we have in fact found a sure way of reducing recidivism through rehabilitation;. 
Tl See id. at 47 (noting that rehabilitation and treatment to alter behavior leas than 
deterrence mechanisms). 
1 '  But see United States v. Hopkins, 531 F.2d 576, 584 n.51 (D.C. Cir. 1976) ('The 
conclusions of  those who have critically examined programs implemented during the rise of 
the era of the 'rehabilitative ideal' with regard to their efficacy in reducing recidivism and 
tendency to be used to justify substantial encroachments on liberty should be carefully 
considered in our rethinking of the intended goals of our system of criminal justice. 
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Whether this was because prisoners could not or did not want to 
rehabilitate, the programs were incapable of rehabilitating them, 
or the prison environment itself was in tension with the idea of 
rehabilitation-or all three--was unclear.79
The model of rehabilitation as training subsequently became 
even more modest. It did not hold out that the purpose of 
punishment was training, as in: we send people to prison so that 
they can enroll in vocational and educational training. Instead, it 
became the idea that if offenders were going to be in prison 
anyway, then it could not hurt to also give them training. It might 
not help, either, but it was an acceptable alternative to doing 
nothing. The purpose of punishment may not be rehabilitation (as 
the rehabilitation-as-treatment people believed, and as some of the 
more optimistic rehabilitation-as-training advocates proposed), but 
it could be a place where some rehabilitation might occur. The fact 
that rehabilitation does not work all that well should not be a 
deterrent to having rehabilitation at all. As the Court put it in 
Greenholtz, ''The fact that anticipations and hopes for 
rehabilitation programs have fallen far short of expectations of a 
generation ago need not lead states to abandon hopes for those 
objectives."8 0  Maybe rehabilitation programs worked a little, even 
if they did not work "spectacularly."81 
In his classic opinion in United States v. Bergman, Judge 
Marvin Frankel gave clear form to the emerging wisdom about 
rehabilitation as training. "[T]his Court," Frankel wrote, "shares 
the growing understanding that no one should ever be sent to 
prison for rehabilitation."82 Nonetheless, "[i]f someone must be 
imprisoned-for other, valid reasons-we should seek to make 
rehabilitative resources available to him or her."83 Rehabilitation 
could remain a goal and a resource for those already in prison, but 
Although one cannot help but be disillusioned by such failures, it is important not to give up 
all hope. These failures may be attributable, at )east in part, to the dearth of resources 
committed to making rehabilitative programs in institutions work, and the often haphazard 
manner by which such programs are implemented."). 
7t For a sober-eyed assessment of Nhabilitation as tnining'e failure by a current inmate, 
see generally Jeremiah Bourgeoius, The lrreleuance of Reform: Mcuuration in the 
Department of Corrections, 11 OHIO ST. J.  CRIM. L. 149 (2013). 
80 Oreenholtz v. Inmates of the Neb. Penal & Corr. Complex, 442 U.S. 1, 13 (1979). 
II See JOEL SAMAHA, CRIMINAL JUSTICE 500 (7th ed. 2006). 
u 416 F. Supp. 496, 499 (S.O.N.Y. 1976). 
113 Id. 
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it could no longer be the goal of punishment,84 a position that 
would later be codified.85 
C. R E H A B I L I T A T I O N  A S  M O R A L  R E F O R M
There is a third model of rehabilitation that is important to 
point out, and its ambitions lie somewhere in between 
rehabilitation as treatment and rehabilitation as training. 
Rehabilitation as reform, as I shall call it, can be helpfully 
compared and contrasted with rehabilitation as treatment. Like 
rehabilitation as treatment, rehabilitation as reform emphasizes 
not just making the offender a more productive member of society, 
but fundamentally changing him. Unlike rehabilitation as 
treatment, however, this change is not along the lines of a medical 
paradigm where the offender is sick and needs to be cured. 
Rather, the offender needs to be morally educated: he needs to 
learn that what he has done was wrong, and to (at least) feel 
remorse over it. The offender is not supposed to just "fit in," he is 
supposed to become almost a different person, a "reformed" person 
through a process of moral reflection. The idea of rehabilitation as 
reform has not fig u r ed much in recent jurisprudence (the exception 
to this, I will argue, is Graham), although it has recently enjoyed a 
renewed vogue in moral and political theory. 8 6
114 See id. ("lT)he goal of rehabilitation cannot fairly serve in itself as grounds for the 
sentence to confinement.;; see also Greenholtz, 442 U.S. at 13-14 ("The objective of 
rehabilitating convicted persons to be userul, law-abiding members of society can remain a 
goal no matter how disappointing the progress. But it will not contribute to these desirable 
objectives to invite or encourage a continuing state of adversary relations between society 
and the inmate."). 
" See 28 U.S.C. § 994(k) (2006) ("The Commission shall insure that the guidelines reRect 
the inappropriateness of imposing a sentence to a term of imprisonment for the purpose of 
rehabilitating the defendant or providing the defendant with needed educational or 
vocational training, medical care, or other correctional treatment.;. 
" For good recent statements, see Zachary Hoskins, Punishment, Contempt, and the 
Prospect of Moral Reform, 32 CRIM. J.  ETHICS 1, 9-10 (2013) (explaining what it means to 
reform a person); Steven Sverdlik, Punishment and Reform 5 (Jan.I, 2012) (unpublished 
manuscript}, available at http://digitalrepository.smu.edu/hum_sci_philoaophy_research/1 
(explaining that reform and rehabilitation are not identical goals, because rehabilitation 
assumes that criminals are mentally ill and in need of therapy); see also WALTER MOBERLY, 
THE: ETHICS OF PUNISHMENT 261 (1968) (noting that the goal of reform is to create in 
prisoners "some sense of moral responsibility''); Jean Hampton, The Moral Education 
Theory of Punishment, 13 PHIL. & PUB. AFFAIRS 208, 232-33 (1984) (discussing the 
interaction or moral education theory with sentencing polic y); ANTONY DUFF, PuNISHMENT, 
COMMUNICATION, AND COMMUNITY 6 (2001) (contrasting rehabilitation, which seeks to 
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The idea of rehabilitation as moral reform is in fact a very old 
idea, and possibly the oldest association between punishment and 
rehabilitation. 87 It is at least as old as the penitentiary, where 
convicts were meant to go and, in solitude, reflect on their wrongs 
and show penance for them. 88 We punish with the hope that this 
will induce the off ender to reflect and become a morally better 
person; but of course punishment is neither necessary nor 
sufficient for a person to reform. You can be punished but not 
reform, and you can reform without being punished.89 Reform 
does not happen by punishing, rather, it is what punishing is 
supposed to spur. 
It is not obvious how this reform was supposed to happen. 
Perhaps being punished was enough to induce in the offender 
feelings of remorse and repentance.90 Perhaps it was through 
being isolated from outside, corrupting influences that prisoners 
could finally have a chance to reform.91 Or perhaps it was a little 
of both. As de Beaumont and de Toqeuveville explained in their 
survey of American prisons: 
improve a person's skills, capacities, and opportunities, with reform of their diepositione or 
motives); Herbert Morris, A Paternalistic TMor y  of Pun.ishmen.t, in. WHY PUNISH? HOW 
MUCH? 179 (Michael Tonry ed., 2011) (contrasting a paternalistic theory of punishment, 
which focuses on doing good to wrongdoers, with rehabilitative theories). 
I am also extremely indebted, in my exposition of the reform ideal, to an amicue brief 
in the Tapia case. See generally Brief Amicus Curiae by Invitation of the Court, Tapia v. 
United States, 131 S. Ct. 2382 (2011) (No. 10-5400), 2011 W L  882592. 
111 It is arguably present in Plato's work. See Plato, Pun.i&hment as Cure, in. 
PHILOSOPHICAL PERSPECTIVES ON PUNISHMENT 37 (Gertrude Ezorsky ed., 1972) ("(A) just 
penalty disciplines us and makes us more just and cures us Crom evil."); J.E. Mc'l'aggart, 
Hegel's Theory of Puni&hmen.t, in. PHILOSOPHICAL PERSPECTNES ON PuNJSHMENT, supra, at 
41 (noting that Hegel's theory is that punishment may cause a wrongdoer to truly repent of 
hie sin). 
as See the discussion by Stith and Cabranes or the -civic ideal of reformation through 
punishment," in STITH & CABRANES, supra note 28, at 15 (".Associated most prominently 
with the Pennsylvania Quaker physician Benjamin Rush and his friend Benjamin Franklin, 
the ideal of personal reformation was at the heart of the movement to transform existing 
penal institutions into more humane institutions or treatment and reform."). See also 
DAVID J. ROTHMAN, THE DISCOVERY OF THE AsYLUM 85 (1971) (describing how isolation 
caused convicts to consider the error of their ways). 
" On this, see my Commentary: What is the point of prisollV (St. Louis Public Radio, June 
5, 2014). 
ao Thia was emphasized by McTaggart, supra note 87, at 51: "[t]he aim of punishment 
is . . .  to produce repentance." 
11 ROTHMAN, supra note 88, at 71. 
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Thrown into solitude [the prisoner] reflects. Placed 
alone, in view of his crime, he learns to hate it; and if 
his soul be not yet surfeited with crime, and thus have 
lost all taste for any thing better, it is in solitude, 
where remorse will come to assail him . . . .  Can there 
be a combination more powerful for reformation than 
that of a prison which hands over the prisoner to all 
the trials of solitude, leads him through reflection to 
remorse, through religion to hope . . .  ?92
401 
For rehabilitation as reform, other people, such as judges and 
jailors cannot themselves directly cause moral reform. Doctors 
and experts cannot do it, nor can vocational counselors or 
psychologists, although perhaps they can help at the margins. 
Training may be a good way to show reformation, but it is possible 
to be well-trained but not morally reformed. You could be an 
excellent worker or student, but a bad person. Only your own 
efforts, the hard work of reflection, can lead you to remorse, 
repentance, and hope. 
The model of rehabilitation as reform in its expectation of what 
the prisoner was supposed to achieve rivals rehabilitation as 
treatment in its ambition. Your time in prison was meant to help 
cure you, not in the sense that you were sick and now you are well, 
but in the sense that you were morally corrupt and now you are 
morally pure (or more pure). In some more aggressive versions, 
the very purpose of punishment is that it can induce this reform: 
we punish you so that you will reform yourself. In a less ambitious 
version, rehabilitation as moral reform requires that prison should 
not hinder the goal of moral reform (where punishment might be 
justified on other grounds).93 At a minimum, prison should not be 
a place where you came out brutalized and degraded.94
In either its more or less ambitious versions, however, the goal 
of moral reform is fundamentally incompatible with rehabilitation 
as treatment. The therapeutic model dispenses with remorse and 
n GUSTAVE DE BEAUMONT & ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, O N  THE PENITENTIARY SYSTEM IN 
THE UNITED STATES AND ITS APPLICATION IN FRANCE 22, 51 (Francis Lieber trans., Carey, 
Lea & Blanchard 1833).
113 See Hoskins, supra note 86, at 11 (arguing that punishment should not undermine 
prospects for reform). 
H Morrie, supra note 86, at 168. 
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regret (should we feel guilty for having a cold or for having gout?) 
and places the prisoner in the hands of a doctor. Moral reform, by 
contrast, requires that the offender accept his responsibility and 
strive to atone for it; he undergoes a kind of "secular penance."96 
In this respect, moral reform is often tied to retributivism, but it 
is, I believe, distinct from it. Retribution at its core says that 
people deserve to be punished.96 It says nothing about whether 
those who are punished believe that they are responsible or that 
they should show remorse for what they have done.97 Moral 
reform, by contrast, requires these things, and indeed may require 
that punishment should cease after moral reform has been 
achieved. 98 
This model-although very old-had new life given to it in the 
Graham decision. Both in rhetoric and in substance, the Court 
held out prison as a place where moral reform might happen or at 
least not frustrate the possibility for moral reform.99 But first we 
need to set the context for the rise of rehabilitation in Graham-in 
the Court's conflicted yet ultimately skeptical view of the 
rehabilitative ideal in almost all of its forms. 
III. THE REHABILITATIVE IDEAL IN PRACTICE I: STATUTORY 
INTERPRETATION 
I have already mentioned how rehabilitation in some of its 
guises has appeared in older federal and Supreme Court cases. 
96 R.A. Durr, Penance, Punishment, and the Limits of Community, in WHY PUNISH? How 
MUCH?, supra note 86, at 179. 
H See, e.g., MlCHAELMOORE, PLACINO BLAME 153 (1997). 
01 Characterizing punishment as a "reformative enterprise," Duff, supra note 95, at 179, 
seems fundamentally different than viewing i t  ea a way or giving out "just deserts." At  best, 
i t  may be a condition of punishment being "reformative" that i t  is only given to those who 
deserve it. See also my discussion or this point in Chad Flanders, The Case Against the 
Ca se Against the Death Penalty, 16 NEW CRIM. L. REV. 696, 610 (2013). 
ea Contra DUFF, supra note 86, at 111�18. I t  may be thought that so-called shaming 
punishments might induce a type of moral reform; I am not sure this is correct. At leaet, i t  
is an open question whether shaming serves more to degrade the offender than to inspire 
him to reform himself. I t  ie, however, also an open question whether prison. is all in all less 
degrading than shaming punishments. For my re0ections on this, see Chad Flanders, 
Shame and the Meanings of Punishment, 54 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 609, 622 (2006). 
99 See Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 76 (2010) (holding that the state must give 
defendants "some meaningful opportunity to obtain release based on demonstrated 
maturity and rehabilitation"). 
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But discussions about the meaning of rehabilitation have played a 
significant role in two recent cases besides Graham, although the 
focus in these cases was on the Sentencing Reform Act (SRA) and 
its interpretation and use of rehabilitation. 100 Nonetheless, in 
Tapia u. United States101 and Pepper u. United States102 (both 
decided in 2011), the Supreme Court made more general, almost 
philosophical, statements about the meaning of rehabilitation. 
Interestingly, statements in the two cases seem to be directly at 
odds with one another (Tapia seems anti- the rehabilitative ideal; 
Pepper pro-). Whether the competing statements can be reconciled 
in terms of a larger principle is the focus of the last section of this 
Part. 
The two cases also form an important backdrop for my reading 
of Graham, despite the fact that they were decided after Graham. 
Indeed, they form a bridge between the history of the 
rehabilitative ideal and its present reality. Parts of that ideal 
continue to be in play in the Court's jurisprudence, but mostly the 
Court is acting against a background of pronounced hostility to 
rehabilitation: a hostility that was codified in the SRA, but that 
the Court also seems to share. 103 How Graham could emphasize 
the ideal of rehabilitation in this context is addressed in the next 
Part. 
A. THE REJECTION OF REHABILITATION: TAPIA
Tapia concerned the sentencing of Alexander Tapia, who was
convicted by a jury for bringing illegal immigrants into the United 
States for financial gain.104 At sentencing, the judge gave Tapia 
fifty-one months in prison, but was ambiguous as to the reasons 
why she was being sentenced to that particular term. According to 
the sentencing judge, the sentence for Tapia had "to be sufficient 
to provide[ ] needed correctional treatment, and here I think the 
100 For background on the SRA, see STITH & CABRANES, supra note 28, at 38-77. 
101 131 S. Ct. 2382 (2011). 
102 131 S. Ct. 1229 (2011). 
103 See, e.g., Tapia, 131 S. Ct. at 2391 (describing legislative history, the SRA, and 
attributing Congress's skepticism over the efiectiveneSB of rehabilitation in prison to 
"decades or experience with indeterminate sentencing"). 
'°' Id. at 2383. 
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needed correctional treatment is the 500 Hour Drug Program."105 
The judge went on: 
Here I have to say that one of the factors that-I  am 
going to impose a 51-month sentence, . . .  and one of 
the factors that affects this is the need to provide 
treatment. In other words, so she is in long enough to 
get the 500 Hour Drug Program, number one. 106 
Stated differently, the sentencing judge seemed to be indicating 
that one of the main reasons (if not the main reason) that Tapia 
was being given fifty-one months was so that she would be eligible 
for drug treatment. 107 If drug treatment had not been possible, or 
not available, Tapia would have gotten a lesser sentence. 108 The 
Court found that the trial judge had erred in extending Tapia's 
sentence so that she could receive drug treatment, and remanded 
her case to the Ninth Circuit to determine whether Tapia's failure 
to object to her punishment at sentencing meant she was without 
any remedy. 109
Read narrowly, Tapia is an opinion about statutory construction; 
in particular, whether § 3582(a) of the Sentencing Reform Act (SRA) 
made a punishment permissible that was imposed, in part or in 
whole, for the sake of a prisoner's rehabilitation. That section, in 
relevant part, provided that the court, "in determining whether to 
impose a term of imprisonment, and, if a term of imprisonment is to 
be imposed, in determining the length of the term" should recognize 
"that imprisonment is not an appropriate means of promoting 
correction and rehabilitation."110 Justice Kagan, writing for the 
Court, interpreted this to mean that a sentencing judge could not 
impose or increase a convicted person's sentence in order to advance 
the goal of rehabilitation. m Much like Judge Frankel's position in 
105 Id. at 2385 (quotation omitted). 
1119 Id. (quotation omitted). 
101 Justices Sotomayor and Alito, in concurrence, disagreed with this assessment. See id. 
at 2393--94 (Sotomayor, J., concurring) (asserting that the District Court did not elongate 
Tapia's term "beyond that necessary for deterrence"). 
1o1 See id. at  2385 (linking the sentence to Tapia's need Cor drug treatment). 
109 Id. at 2392-93. 
110 18 U.S.C. § 3582(a) (2006). 
111 Tapia, 131 S. Ct. 2391. 
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the Bergman case, the SRA allowed consideration of rehabilitation 
once a punishment of imprisonment had been determined on other 
grounds, hut not in the formulation of the length of imprisonment or 
even whether imprisonment was appropriate. 112 Rehabilitation 
might be appropriate in choosing a punishment other than 
imprisonment, that is, in rejecting prison as an option. 113 It could 
not be the basis of choosing imprisonment over other alternatives or 
(more importantly for the Tapia case) deciding on a longer term of 
imprisonment. 
But the Court sweeps more broadly in construing the SRA, 
construing it as wholly rejecting almost any except the most 
modest version of the rehabilitative ideal. Again, the Court is only 
interpreting a statute, not giving its own independent judgment of 
rehabilitation, but the emphasis on the SRA's repudiation of 
rehabilitation is instructive. Quoting from and relying on its 
decision in Mistretta, the Court noted that sentencing prior to the 
SRA was "premised on a faith in rehabilitation."114 That faith 
required that judges and other correctional officers be permitted to 
base "their respective sentencing and release decisions upon their 
own assessments of the offender's amenability to rehabilitation."H6 
A prisoner was to stay in prison until he had shown that he 
could safely reenter society, that is, that he had been rehabilitated. 
Accordingly, release "often coincided with 'the successful 
completion of certain vocational, educational, and counseling 
programs within the prisons."116 But this model "fell into 
disfavor," not only because it resulted in sentencing disparities, 
but more fundamentally, because many began to doubt that prison 
and prison programs could reliably rehabilitate offenders (and that 
officials could tell when prisoners had been successfully 
rehabilitated) .117
112 See United States v. Mogel, 956 F.2d 1655, 1563 (11th Cir. 1992) ("Rehabilitative 
considerations have been declared irrelevant for purposes of deciding whether or not to impose 
a prison sentence and, if so, what prison sentence to impose.''), cert denied, 506 U.S. 867 
(1992). 
113 Indeed, the statute could be read as positively encouraging options other than prison if 
one had rehabilitation in mind as a goal. 
11• Tapia, 131 S.  Ct. at  2386. 
11a Id. (quoting Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 363 (1989)). 
11• Id. at 238 7 (quoting S. REP. No. 98-225, at 40 (1!183)). 
117 Id. at 2387. 
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I n  other words, according to the Tapia Court, the SRA 
effectively repudiated Williams, at least when it  came to 
imprisoning offenders, and by doing so pushed courts to move 
beyond rehabilitation as treatment (and its reliance on expert 
judgment and indeterminate sentencing) and even rehabilitation 
as training (at least on any strong version of that model). us 
Determinate sentencing, and not individualized sentences, was 
now the order of the day: judges were constrained in picking and 
choosing punishment based on facts about the offender, and about 
his capacity for rehabilitation. Rehabilitative training and 
treatment could go on in prison but it  could not be treated as a 
goal of punishment; they were things that could occur only after an 
appropriate punishment had been fixed. 119 Even then, there was 
little guarantee that any "vocational, educational, and counseling 
programs"120 within prison would be successful. I f  Congress 
wanted courts to be able to mandate rehabilitation as training in 
prison, the Court noted, it would have given them the power to 
impose training or drug treatment on offenders in prison, but it 
notably did not give them that power. 12 1 Courts can only 
"recommend" training and treatment for offenders who are to be 
imprisoned, 12 2 and Justice Kagan, in an aside, encouraged them to 
do so.123 But they cannot require it.124 
ue See, e.g., United States v. Grant, 664 F.3d 276, 280-81 (9th Cir. 2011) ("The Court read 
the statute as a broad rejection of imprisonment as a means 0£ promoting rehabilitation."). 
119 See Tapia, 131 S. Ct. at  2389-90. 
120 Id. at 2386 (quoting S. REP. No. 98-225, at  40 (1983)). 
121 See id. at 2390 ("II Congress . . .  meant to aUow courts to base prison terms on 
offenders' rehabilitative needs, it would have given courts the capacity to ensure that 
offenders participate in prison correctional programs."). 
122 See id. C'A sentencing court can recommend that the [Bureau of Prisons! place an 
offender in a particular facility or program."). 
123 Id. at 2392 C'So the sentencing court here did nothing wrong-and probably something 
very right-in trying to get Tapia into an effective drug treatment program."). 
m Id. at 2393. After Tapia was decided, a circuit split quickly developed on its meaning 
regarding a revocation of supervised release. See Douglas A Berman, Quick Circuit Split 
on Tapias Impact for Superuised Release, SENT'O L. & POLY (July 20, 2011, 11:39 AM), 
available at http:/lwww.sentencing.typepad.com/sentencing_law_and_policy/2011/07/quick-
circuit•split•on•tapias•impact•for•revocation•of.supervised,release.html (discusaing the split 
between the First and Fifth Circuits on this ieeue). 
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B. PEPPER AND THE REAFFIRMATION OF THE IDEAL
Surprisingly, in the same term as Tapia, the Court reaffirmed
its holding in Williams in terms that were almost as sweeping as 
Tapia's rejection of the rehabilitative ideal. Pepper v. United 
States involved a unique set of facts: Jason Pepper had pied guilty 
to a conspiracy to distribute more than 500 grams of 
methamphetamine.125 He was sentenced to a twenty-four month 
term in prison, an almost seventy-five percent departure from the 
normal sentencing range, and five years of supervised release. 126 
The Government appealed the sentence, 127 and two years after the 
original sentencing decision, Pepper's original sentence was 
reversed and remanded by the Eighth Circuit for resentencing. 12 B 
In the meantime, Pepper served his twenty-four month prison 
term and began a period of supervised release. 129 At his 
resentencing hearing in 2006, Pepper and several witnesses 
testified that he had, inter alia, completed a 500 hour drug 
program,130 no longer was abusing drugs, had enrolled in college 
(and was getting straight As), had a part-time job, and had 
reconciled with his family.m 
The district court again sentenced Pepper to twenty-four 
months, relying on Pepper's post-sentencing rehabilitation and 
explaining "it would [not] advance any purpose of federal 
sentencing policy or any other policy behind the federal sentencing 
guidelines to send [Pepper] back to prison."132 The government 
appealed and Pepper's sentence was once more reversed and 
remanded to the district court.133 In  its ruling, the Eighth Circuit 
explained that the district court had abused its discretion in 
considering post-sentencing rehabilitation as a sentencing factor, 
both because it was not "relevant" and "would create unwarranted 
sentencing disparities and inject blatant inequities into the 
126 131 S. Ct. 1229, 1236 (2011). 
i,c Id. 
m Id. 
l:z& Id. 
i21 Id. 
130 Interestingly, this seems to be the same program that was at issue in Tapia. Tapia v. 
United States, 131 S. Ct. 2382, 2385 (2011). 
131 Pepper, 131 S. Ct. at 1236-37. 
1:si Id. at 1237 (quotation omitted). 
1:t.1 Id. 
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sentencing process."134 At Pepper's second resentencing hearing in 
2008 (and third sentencing hearing overall), Pepper and others 
again testified to Pepper's continuing rehabilitation (he was still 
attending school and still working, but also had recently 
married).135 This time, the district court rejected Pepper's request 
for a downward variance, and Pepper was sentenced to sixty-five 
months.136 After losing at the Court of Appeals, Pepper appealed 
to the Supreme Court.137 He won.13B 
The Court defended the right of judges at sentencing to consider 
all factors in sentencing, even evidence that was not available to 
the original sentencing judge.139 In  favoring broad discretion, the 
Court found its most germane precedent in Williams, the case in 
which the Court had most blatantly adopted aspects of the 
rehabilitative ideal. 'We have emphasized," the Pepper Court 
said, quoting Williams, that "[h]ighly relevant-if not essential-to 
[the] selection of an appropriate sentence is the possession of the 
fullest information possible concerning the defendant's life and 
characteristics."14D 
The language the Pepper Court quoted from Williams is the 
language that the rehabilitation as treatment model bequeathed to 
the Court: experts and judges need to have full information and 
wide latitude when sentencing, because the idea behind sentencing 
is not to give a "one size fits all" punishment but to tailor or 
"individualize" a punishment based on the particularities of each 
offender. 141 As the Court also quoted from Williams, "the 
punishment should fit the offender and not merely the crime.''142 
The best sentence is the right prescription based on an 
individualized diagnosis that will lead to the offender's 
rehabilitation. 143 Indeed, Pepper goes even further than Williams 
1:,.c Id. at 1237-38 (quoting 486 F.3d 408, 413 (8th Cir. 2007)). 
•� Id. at 1238. 
i:ia Id.
137 Id. at 1239. 
131 See id. 
139 Id. at 1241-43. 
1•0 Id. at 1240 (quoting Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241, 247 (1949)). 
1 1 See supra Part II.A. 
142 Pepper, 131 S. Ct. at 1240 (quoting Williams, 337 U.S. at 247). 
1u See Williams, 337 U.S. at 247 ("The belief no longer prevails that every offense in a like
legal category calls for an identical punishment without regard to the past life and habits of 
a particular offender."). 
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did, emphasizing the need to consider evidence of the offender's 
character not only before but even well after the moment of 
conviction. 144 
Of course, the Pepper Court does not say that individualized 
punishments are intrinsically related to rehabilitation as 
treatment; then again, neither did the Williams Court. But recall 
that rehabilitation as training also required that sentences be 
individually tailored. In this regard it is revealing what additional 
facts the district court in Pepper's resentencing thought especially 
relevant, viz., the fact that he was attending college, held a steady 
job, and had reconciled in his family. 145 In short, Pepper had 
rehabilitated himself, not in the sense that he was sick and getting 
better (the rehabilitation as treatment model) but in the sense that 
he was well on his way to becoming a fit and productive member of 
society (the rehabilitation as training model). 
The inference is almost impossible to miss: Pepper was getting 
a lower sentence because he was getting rehabilitated outside of 
prison and so would need fewer years of rehabilitation inside 
prison. The Pepper Court held as much. 146 Evidence of Pepper's 
rehabilitation prior to his sentencing was relevant because it was 
"highly relevant to several" of the statutorily mandated factors 
judges were to consider at sentencing, including the purpose of 
"provid[ing] the defendant with needed educational or vocational 
training." 147 Sentences should be individualized, Pepper held, and 
one of the things that matters to individualization is whether the 
offender needs (or in Pepper•s case, doesn't need) rehabilitation. 
Rehabilitation, in short, is a sentencing factor. 
C. RECONCILING TAPIA AND PEPPER 
Can the two cases-decided in the same Supreme Court T e r m -
be reconciled? At a high enough level of abstraction, Tapia and 
Pepper go in strikingly different directions. Tapia repudiates 
Williams; Pepper embraces it. As far as the interpretation of the 
SRA, Tapia seems to have the better story. Indeed, Justice Alita 
144 Pepper, 131 S. Ct. at 1241-42. 
m Id. at 1242. 
u, Id. at 1242-43. 
10 Id. at 1242 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2)(D) (2006)). 
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picked out the majority's reliance on Williams in Pepper for special 
ridicule. "Anyone familiar with the history of criminal sentencing 
in this country cannot fail to see the irony in the Court's praise for 
the sentencing scheme exemplified by Williams," Alita wrote. 148 
But, he continued, "[b]y the time of the enactment of the 
Sentencing Reform Act in 1984, this scheme had fallen into 
widespread disrepute."149 He rejected the Court's opinion in' 
Pepper as an ill-advised "paean" to the "old regime.''160 
More substantively, the two decisions are at odds as to whether 
rehabilitation is a sentencing factor. Tapia reads the SRA and 
particular provisions of it  as positively removing rehabilitation as 
a factor for judges to consider. 161 Pepper favors judges considering 
an offender's past rehabilitation as relevant to whether he needs 
further rehabilitation. 152 Trying to find a distinction between the 
two uses of rehabilitation seems formalistic. We could say that 
Tapia is about using rehabilitation to increase a sentence, whereas 
Pepper is about using rehabilitation to decrease a sentence. But 
then both are still ways of using rehabilitation as a sentencing 
factor. I f  prison is not an appropriate means for promoting 
rehabilitation at all (as the statute at issue in Tapia suggests), 
then it should not have been a relevant factor in Pepper's case. 
But it seems obvious that rehabilitation was a driving factor in at 
least one of Pepper's sentencing decisions: because Pepper was 
already rehabilitated, he needed less rehabilitation in prison.163 I f  
Tapia is correct about rehabilitation as a sentencing factor, then 
Pepper seems wrongly decided and vice versa.164 
14! Id. at 1256 (Alit.o, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (citing Williams, 337 
U.S. at  241). 
141 Id. at 1256-57. 
1so Id. at 1257. 
141 See supra notes 114-24 and accompanying text. 
m See supra notes 147-48 and accompanying text. 
153 See supra notes 146-48 and accompanying text. 
1" If we extend the logic of Pepper further, its tension with Tapia becomes even more 
manifest. Suppose Pepper had done bad things prior to his conviction (he had lost his job, 
or gotten a divorce, or flunked out of school), then presumably these facts would be relevant, 
but relevant because they showed the need for further rehabilitation. If Pepper's good acts 
are relevant to decreasing his sentence because he has already been rehabilitated, then his 
had acts would seem to be relevant for the SBDle reason: because they show the need for 
more rehabilitation. 
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But there may be a way we can give more substance to the 
seeming formalism. Suppose we take Tapia's rule not to be the 
blanket one that rehabilitation cannot be used as a factor when 
sentencing someone to prison; suppose, instead, we take it to be 
that, because prison is bad for rehabilitation, it should not be used 
to put someone in prison in the first place, or to lengthen his 
sentence once there. That is, if prison is bad for rehabilitation, 
then judges should never factor in someone's need for 
rehabilitation when considering whether to increase his term in 
prison. 
By the same token, if prison is bad for rehabilitation, then 
judges should factor in someone's need for rehabilitation when 
considering whether to decrease his term in prison (or not to 
sentence him to prison at all). In short, the SRA doesn't dictate 
that judges should never consider someone's need for 
rehabilitation. It dictates that judges should consider someone's 
need for rehabilitation only when it means that they should get 
less time in prison. The principle that emerges of out of the cases 
then is: prison is bad for rehabilitation. Under this principle, both 
Tapia and Pepper were correctly decided because they both did not 
use rehabilitation as a factor that might increase prison time, 
Tapia because it rejected a longer sentence and Pepper because it 
licensed a lower sentence. 
Viewed in this light, Pepper is as anti-rehabilitative as Tapia. 
Both opinions are aware that rehabilitation programs are 
available in prison. But such programs are only relevant, if they 
are relevant at all, if prison time is going to be imposed anyway. If 
punishment is to be imposed, it is probably a good thing to 
commend them. The model at play here is mostly rehabilitation as 
training but in the modest way Judge Frankel endorsed it. 155 
Judges should be aware that rehabilitative programs are there for 
prisoners, but they should not operate under the idea that prison 
is being imposed for rehabilitation-whether by itself or in 
conjunction with educational, vocational, or treatment programs. 
At best, rehabilitation is something that should be pursued outside 
156 For a reading of Tapia along these lines see William Peacock, Prison ia for Punishment, 
Not Rehabilitation?, FINDLAW: U.S. FOURTH CIRCUlT (Oct. 31, 2012, 3:04 PM), http://blogs. 
findlaw.com/fourth_circuit/2012Jl0/prison•is•for-punishment-not-rehabilitation.html. 
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of prison (including while supervised by the criminal justice 
system), but never in prison. 156 
IV. THE REHABILITATIVE IDEAL IN PRACTICE II: THE
CONSTITUTION 
Graham was a constitutional decision and not a statutory one, 
and it was decided before both Tapia and Pepper. Nonetheless, its 
emphasis on rehabilitation is striking. Both Tapia and Pepper 
show an awareness of the doubt; which predates those cases, about 
rehabilitation that resulted in Congress passing the SRA. u;7 And 
when set against other constitutional cases discussing 
punishment, Graham's focus on rehabilitation is an outlier. In 
Roper u. Simmons, decided before Graham and which Graham 
most closely resembles, the focus was on retribution and 
deterrence, and whether the death penalty was a proportional 
punishment for children who are found guilty of murder.158 It 
barely mentioned rehabilitation, which, given Graham, seems 
odd. 169 Death forecloses rehabilitation at least as much as life 
without parole does (if not more). 160 Why was rehabilitation so 
important in Graham, and equally as important, what did 
Graham mean by rehabilitation? 
A. GRAHAM'S REHABILITATIVE HOLDING 
The early response to Graham understandably focused on its
extension of the "evolving standards of decency" test beyond the 
death penalty to sentences to life without parole. 161 Whether the 
1541 Thanks to Eric Miller for helping me to aee this point more clearly. 
111 See Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 365 (1989) ("Serious disparities in 
sentences, however, were common. Rehabilitation aa a sound penological theory came to be 
questioned and, in any event, was regarded by some as an unattainable goal for most 
cases." (citing NORVAL MORRIS, THE FUTURE OF IMPRISONMENT 24-43 (1974))). 
1H Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 564 (2005). 
ue Id. at 568-76.
""' But see Meghan J. Ryan, Death and Rehabilitation, 46 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1231, 1282 
(2013) (arguing lhat a death sentence ia not incompatible with rehabilitation); Flanders, 
supra note 97, at 612-15 (same). Perhaps lhe Roper Court thought i t  went without saying 
that death caMot rehabilitate. But in  Graham, that fact alone--thal a punishment may 
forecwse rehabilitation-does real work in showing that the punishment ia unconstitutional. 
My question is: why was that work not done on Roper, or at least hinted at? 
1e1 See supra note 2 and accompanying text. 
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Court's reasoning will be extended to other sentences and other 
groups (besides juveniles) still remains to be seen, and is the focus 
of much good work in the area. 162 But Graham's more lasting 
impact may be its renewed emphasis on rehabilitation. Indeed, 
the fact that life in prison without parole foreclosed "the 
rehabilitative ideal" (as the Court put it)163 is central to its 
holding. Indeed, it is perhaps the theme of the opinion, as well as 
the basis of some of its more rhetorically moving passages. 
Consider in this regard how the Graham Court treats 
incapacitation as one of the legitimate goals of punishment, which 
shows how rehabilitation emerges as a theme in the opinion.164 
Even here, prior to the Court's explicit discussion of rehabilitation 
as a purpose of punishment, rehabilitation creeps in. 
Incapacitation is a valid rationale for punishment, Justice 
Kennedy writes, but not here, because "[t]o justify life without 
parole . . .  for juveniles'' requires a judgment that the juvenile will 
be a danger to society forever, which is to say, a judgment that the 
juvenile is incorrigible. 165 Kennedy goes on to say that a judgment 
of incorrigibility will be very difficult to make.166 I t  will be hard to 
decide whether a juvenile's crime is the result of "transient 
immaturity" or the result of "irreparable corruption."167 
So far, Kennedy's point is relatively modest, and for that reason 
also vulnerable. The fact that it may be hard to find those who are 
irreparably corrupt does not mean that no juveniles might be 
irreparably corrupt, and that a legislature might rationally target 
those who are. At least at this point, the argument only suggests 
stricter standards or closer analysis for deciding who gets life 
without parole, a point emphasized by Chief Justice Roberts in his 
concurring opinion. 16 8  We do not need a categorical ban on life 
without parole, just a more carefully targeted limit. Some 
1112 See, e.g., Steiker & Steiker, supra note 3, at 79-80. 
ie3 Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 74 (2010). 
184 Lynn Branham (in conversation) has stressed how rehabilitation plays multiple roles 
in Graham: as part of its proportionality analysis, as part of its analysis of the purposes of 
punishment, and in its discussion of a case-by-case approach to sentencing. I agree. M y  
analysis here (as the text says) is illustrative, not exhaustive. 
1M Graham, 560 U.S. at 72. 
111 Id. at 72-73.
•67 Id. at 73 (quoting Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 561, 573 (2005)). 
14111 Id. at 86 (Roberts, C.J., concurring in the judgment).
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juveniles may really be incorrigible, and so we might want to 
incapacitate them. 
But what Kennedy says next in his opinion rules this out. For, 
he writes, "[e]ven if the State's judgment that Graham was 
incorrigible were later corroborated by prison misbehavior or 
failure to mature, the sentence was still disproportionate because 
that judgment was made at the outset."169 That is to say, even if 
incapacitation is fully warranted (and so a rational and just 
punishment), the state cannot engage in it by imprisoning 
juveniles in life without parole. Why? The answer, which becomes 
clearer in the Court's explicit discussion of rehabilitation, is that 
the state cannot foreclose the possibility at the outset that the 
offender could be rehabilitated. Incapacitation is not an 
acceptable rationale for punishment because it rules out the 
offender ever changing for the better. In short, rehabilitation as a 
purpose of punishment trumps incapacitation, even when 
incapacitation is fully justified. 
Rehabilitation is the last purpose of punishment Kennedy 
discusses, although (as we just saw) it shapes the discussion of the 
purposes of punishment that went before it. 170 Again, as with 
incapacitation, a sentence to life without parole passes a judg m ent 
on the juvenile and his "value and place in society," viz., that he is 
"incorrigible" and can never "reenter the community."171 It is cruel 
to say to a juvenile offender that he is "irredeemable"172 and that 
he will never mature enough or be rehabilitated enough to earn 
release. As the Court eloquently puts it later in the opinion, "[l]ife 
in prison without the possibility of parole gives no chance for 
fulfillment outside prison walls, no chance for reconciliation with 
society, no hope."l73 This, the Court says, is cruel and unusual. 174 
The Constitution requires giving juveniles the opportunity to show 
that they can be rehabilitated, "some meaningful opportunity to 
1et Id. a t  7 3 .
no Rehabilitation figures in the proportionality analysis, too: life without parole U1 
disproportionate to the juvenile's offense precisely because it expresses a judgment of 
incorrigibility. See id. {reasoning that a judgment of incorrigibility at the outset is 
"disproportionate;. 
111 Id. at 7 4. 
172 Id. at 75. 
m Id. at 79. 
m See id. at 81-82. 
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obtain release based on demonstrated maturity and 
rehabilitation. "175 
B. GRAHAMS TWO MODELS OF REHABILITATION
Graham's rhetoric is sweeping, which we might expect from 
Justice Kennedy. But what does the rhetoric mean?176 What in 
particular does Kennedy mean by not giving up on the 
"rehabilitative ideal"? Two models of rehabilitation seem to be 
working in Graham, with one ultimately more important than the 
other. Graham occasionally alludes to, and twice makes explicit, 
the ideal of rehabilitation as training. But the rhetoric and the 
overall thrust of Graham fit more comfortably within the ideal of 
rehabilitation as moral reform. 
The initial reference Graham makes to the model of 
rehabilitation as training comes in its discussion of the 
rehabilitative purpose of punishment. The Court cites an amicus 
brief noting that those sentenced to life without parole "are often 
denied access to vocational training and other rehabilitative 
services."177 Juveniles, the Court adds, "are most in needtl of these 
services. 178 A little later, the Court hits the point again: "it is the 
policy in some prisons to withhold counseling, education, and 
rehabilitation programs for those who are ineligible for parole 
consideration."179 In other words, life without parole means not 
only no hope of release, but a denial of opportunities for 
rehabilitation in the form of vocational and educational programs. 
When these passages are combined with the idea that juveniles 
must be able to have a "meaningful opportunity" to obtain release, 
the rehabilitation as training model's influence is patent: prison is 
a place where juveniles, if they work at it and have the right kind 
of support, can become fit and productive members of society and 
so can be released into society. Denying them these services 
"reinforce[s]" the judgment that the juvenile is irredeemable, what 
Kennedy calls a "perverse consequence."180 
178 Id. at 75. 
17' For a philosophical look at KeMedy'e rhetoric of hope, see Ristroph, supra note 14, at 75. 
117 Graham, 560 U.S. at 74. 
" 1  Id. 
n, Id. at 79. 
IID Id. 
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But if  the rehabilitation as training model were the only model 
the Court had in mind, then the Court's opinion, I believe, would 
have a very different shape and tenor. It would not just mention 
that programs should not be closed off to juveniles, but it would 
positively require that those programs be available to them. After 
all, it would be cruel to say that juveniles should be given the hope 
of release while denying them the tools they need to achieve that 
release (in this way, as the Court says in a striking passage, the 
prison system becomes "complicit" in the denial of opportunity18 1) . 
But the Court does not entirely go this way. Instead, it explicitly 
leaves it open to "the State, in the first instance, to explore the 
means and mechanisms for compliance" with the Court's 
instruction that juveniles must be given a "meaningful 
opportunity'' to obtain release. 182 "It is for legislatures," the Court 
says, "to determine what rehabilitative techniques are appropriate 
and effective."183 
Note three things about the Court's phrasing here. First, it is a 
matter for the state, in particular the legislature, and not the 
Court, to find ways to comply with the Court's mandate. In other 
words, there is no particular form or type of specifically 
rehabilitative "opportunity'' that is required. Second, and more 
revealingly, the state need in the end only explore means and 
mechanisms for compliance. It need not, that is, actually 
implement any of these means and mechanisms, at least not yet. 
Indeed, one could imagine that legislatures might determine, and 
even reasonably determine, that "nothing works," so that no 
rehabilitative programs are offered. 18 4  Third, and most important, 
what the Court is referring to is not means and mechanisms of 
rehabilitation, at least not directly: the Court is referring to means 
and mechanisms of release. 18 6  This is not the language of a Court 
that is requiring states adopt the model of rehabilitation as 
m See id. ("In some prisons, moreover, the system itself becomes complicit in the lack of 
development."). 
1si Id. at 75. 
1&:1 Id. at 73-74. 
16' Again, Kennedy's opinion is careful (almost too careful): he rejects the idea that life in 
prison without parole for juveniles might lock them out from rehabilitative programs. This 
is bad, Kennedy says. Id. at 74. But nothing in his opinion holds that states have an 
obligation, in the first place, to institute those programs. 
11111 See id. at 76. 
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training. I t  implies at most that the inmate must have at least an 
opportunity to prove he has matured; this is his "opportunity," not 
the opportunity for educational and vocational programs per se. In 
fact, the Court's language here may just be a long way around to 
saying that the longest permissible sentence for juveniles is life in 
prison with the possibility of parole.186 
H this is all Graham requires, then we might worry about the 
gap between Graham's rehabilitative rhetoric and its remedy; the 
rhetoric of rehabilitation as training is mostly hortatory. States 
post-Graham will have to give juveniles like Graham an 
opportunity, eventually, for release. But they do not have to make 
it any more possible in reality for juveniles to rehabilitate 
themselves and so win release. ''Meaningful opportunity for 
release" becomes more about the preconditions of release than 
conditions of confinement, and the implementation of Graham 
becomes (merely) about specifying those conditions. 187 All the 
same, states may make rehabilitative programs available to 
juveniles, but this is not required of them. 18 8  What is required is 
the possibility of release, not rehabilitation and not even the 
possibility of rehabilitation. 
Is the rhetoric of rehabilitation in Graham empty then? Not 
entirely, and not if we keep in mind that rehabilitation as training 
is only one possible mode of the rehabilitative ideal. There is a 
second strain in the Court's opinion, one that does not focus so 
much on rehabilitative programs that the state has to offer, than 
on the possibility of the offender himself undertaking his own 
moral reform. Recall that in the model of rehabilitation as moral 
reform that reform is not so much the result of prison vocational or 
111 Thus Graham does not lead in any straightforward way t.o creating a "right to 
rehabilitation." See Aaron Sussman, The Paradox of Graham v. Florida CJ11d the Juuen.ile 
Justice System, 37 VT. L. REv. 381, 3 8 �  n.33 (2012) (collecting citations on the "right t.o 
rehabilitative treatment" (quoting Pena v. N.Y. State Div. for Youth, 419 F. Supp. 203, 204 
(S.D.N.Y. 1976))); see also Sally Terry Green, Realistic Opportunity for Release Equol.t 
Rehabilitation: How the States Must Provide Meaningful Opportunity for Release, 16 
BERKELEY J. CRIM. L. 1, 13 (2011) CW[Graham] empowered the States to formuJate appropriate 
and effective rehabilitative techniques."). 
111 See Drinan, supra note 14, at 7 � 2 ;  Sarah French Russell, Reuiew for Release: 
Juvenile Offenders Stale Parole Practices, and the Eighth Amendment, 89 IND. L.J. 373, 
375-77 (2014) (eitploring what the phrase "meaningful opportunity" means). 
111 In the language of the Tapia opinion, Graham seems to say that probably a lot of good 
can come Crom rehabilitation as training, but there is no constitutional mandate for it. 
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educational programs; instead, the reform comes about from the 
individual's own reflection and remorse. What the state has to do 
is hold out hope for the maturation and moral reform, even if (and 
perhaps especially if) it cannot compel it. 
Justice Kennedy's rhetoric echoes the principles of the older 
reform model of rehabilitation almost precisely. The state does not 
have to give Graham access to any rehabilitative programs 
(although it should not deny them to him when he is in prison). 
Rather, the goal is ultimately Graham's rehabilitation of himself. 
In one passage, Justice Kennedy writes that "[m]aturity''-not 
prison, not training-"can lead to that considered reflection which 
is the foundation for remorse, renewal, and rehabilitation."189 
And, in an especially vivid paragraph, Kennedy writes that with a 
sentence of life without parole, Terrance Graham has no 
meaningful opportunity to obtain release "no matter what he 
might do to demonstrate that the bad acts he committed as a 
teenager are not representative of his true character, even if he 
spends the next half century attempting to atone for his crimes 
and learn from his mistakes." 19 0  Training programs may help 
Graham at the margins become a more productive member of 
society, but it is only his own reflection and remorse that can lead 
to his atonement. 
What the rehabilitation as reform model positively prohibits are 
punishments that say to the offender he cannot reform. If 
punishment is to aim at reform, it cannot at the same time make 
the "expressive judgment"19 1 that a person will never reform and 
be able to reenter society. In other words, if the intent behind 
punishment is that the person reform, the punishment cannot 
simultaneously convey the judgment that the person cannot
reform. But this judgment is what (by Kennedy's light) juvenile 
life without parole expresses: that the juvenile is incorrigible. 192 
Indeed, it is this disqualifying aspect of life without parole that is 
the basis of the opinion's most eloquent passage: "[l]ife in prison 
1u Graham, 660 U.S. at 79. 
ivo Id. 
111 Id. at 74. 
ur.r See id. at 79 ("Maturity can lead to that considered reflection which is the foundation 
ror remorse, renewal, and rehabilitation. A young person who knows that he or she has no 
chance to leave prison before tire's end has little incentive to become a responsible 
individual."). 
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without the possibility of parole gives no chance for fulfillment 
outside prison walls, no chance for reconciliation with society, no 
hope."193 Note what disqualifies the punishment in the first 
instance: the judgment that the punishment makes, viz., that the 
offender is without hope of reform. The punishment is not wrong 
for what it does to the offender, but for what it says to him, at the 
outset, about his possibility for moral reform. 194 
This rhetoric matches precisely the rhetoric of rehabilitation as 
moral reform. AB Jean Hampton puts it in her article on 
punishment as moral education, the state "must never regard any 
one it punishes as hopeless, insofar as it  is assuming that each of 
these persons still has the ability to choose to be moral."195 Or 
consider also Antony Duff a statement of the moral reform view as 
one which believes that "we can never have morally adequate 
grounds-nothing could count as morally adequate grounds-for 
treating a person as being beyond redemption." 196 Because life 
without parole regards juveniles as "hopeless" and treats them as 
"beyond redemption," it is prohibited as a punishment. I t  is one 
thing i f  a punishment denies juveniles training. I t  is quite another 
thing if  it denies juveniles hope and "impl[ies] that those subject to 
[life without parole] are to be permanently and irrevocably 
expelled from ordinary community with their fellow citizens."197 
Thus, Graham's basic rehabilitative holding: the state cannot 
discourage a person from reforming by how it sentences. And i f  
the state does not discourage reform, reform may happen, perhaps 
just by dint of juveniles growing older and maturing. ''Maturity" is 
another key word in Graham, and it too fits with the model of 
rehabilitation as moral reform. 198 The state cannot make you 
"mature"; it is a process one undergoes, more or less actively, by 
slowly taking responsibility for oneself. In fact, too much 
193 Id. 
1114 Of course, there may be other things tha.t may also suggest a person cannot reform, 
such as lack or decent prison conditions as well as inadequate opportunities for 
rehabilitative training. The point now, however, is that the Court treats the message sent 
by life in prison without parole as the clearest and moat salient expression of a person's 
inability to reform. 
195 Hampton, supra note 86, at 231. 
11111 R.A DUFF, TRIAI.S AND PUNISHMENTS 266 (1986). 
191 Duff, supra note 96, at 185. 
198 Graham, 560 U.S. at 73. 
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interference can end up hindering one's moral growth. At the 
same time, the state cannot announce that you will simply never 
reform, which it does (Justice Kennedy says) by saying you can 
never be released. 199 
Now we may have a worry about the logic of this argument. 
According to the model of rehabilitation as reform, nothing stops 
reform from happening in prison (through reflection and maturity) 
and indeed, one might be reformed in prison and yet never be 
released.200 Moral reform, in other words, is a good in itself, even 
if it does not have release as its eventual reward. Indeed, if 
offenders reform only for the sake of being released, we may 
wonder whether this might corrupt their efforts at moral reform 
not only by encouraging the pretense of reform when none has 
occurred, but more generally by giving offenders the wrong 
incentives to reform: offenders should show remorse because they 
are remorseful, not because they want to get out of jail.201 
On purely moral reform grounds, there does not seem to be any 
disjunct between remaining in prison and being reformed (nor for 
that matter, need there be any disjunct between being sentenced 
to death and being morally reformed202) . You can live in jail and 
die in jail, and meanwhile undergo an amazing moral 
transformation.2°3 You may be sentenced to death, and show 
contrition prior to your execution, and be a morally changed 
person. All this seems possible, and so raises the question of 
whether offenders need the possibility of release for moral reform 
to be possible. 
But what is important in Graham may be less about release per 
se and more about the message that the impossibility of release 
sends: the state saying that it will never release you seems to 
' "  See id. at 72 (reasoning that this sends a message that a "juvenile is incorrigible"). 
200 See supra notea 86-88 and accompanying text. 
201 See Hampton, supra note 86, at 234 (noting the difficulty in determining whether an 
apparently repentant criminal is truly repentant or is faking repentance). 
:?l>2 See supra note 160 (reasoning that the death penalty is not incompatible with 
rehabilitation). 
203 In addition, you may acquire all sorts of vocational ski l ls- that is, you may be fully 
successful at realizing the ideal of rehabilitation as training-yet only be able to use those 
skills in prison. 
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entail that you will not and cannot be reformed.204 By the same 
token, saying that the state must give you a chance of being 
released strongly suggests that you can be morally reformed. 
What is important is that the state give you hope rather than a 
firm guarantee of release.206 Some juveniles may not, in fact, ever 
be released and so their hopes will remain just that; but they 
cannot be denied hope at the outset.206 Indeed, the judgment at the 
outset is the main wrong of sentencing an offender to life without 
parole and constitutive of that judgment is disallowing an 
meaningful opportunity for release.207 The real wrong is not that 
offenders will not be able to reform themselves if  they spend their 
lives in prison (it is possible that they could). The real wrong is 
that the state, by saying some offenders are unfit to join the 
community ever is making a rather strong statement that those 
offenders can never reform. The rehabilitative holding in Graham 
is not that the state must rehabilitate, but it cannot rule out the 
possibility of rehabilitation taltlng place. 
That this is a rather constrained vision of rehabilitation can be 
shown by the fact that rehabilitation as moral reform is compatible 
with the "prison is bad for rehabilitation" principle of Tapia and 
Pepper. Tapia and Pepper could be reconciled because they both 
said that one could never sentence someone to more prison time 
because that person needed more rehabilitation.208 Prison just 
could not (reliably) be counted on to rehabilitate people. Note, 
though, Justice Kennedy does not require that prison rehabilitate 
juveniles.209 Rehabilitation programs in prison are nice, but not 
required by the Constitution.210 Nor does prison in general have to 
be a place where people usually get better. Nothing in Graham 
entails that prison is good for rehabilitation, and that juveniles 
204 See Graham, 660 U.S. at 76 (asserting that the Eighth Amendment "forbid[s) States 
from making the judgment at the outset that those offenders never will be fit to reenter 
society"). 
206 Note that the state does not necessarily deny hope by failing to provide rehabilitative 
programs. 
21141 See Graham, 560 U.S. at 76 (recognizing that s juvenile convicted of a non-homicide 
crime may never be released, consistent with the Eighth Amendment). 
207 Id. 
2oa Id. 
209 See id. (requiring only a "meaningful opportunity to obtain release"). 
2•0 See id. at 73-74 (noting that determining whether programs are effective and 
appropriate is the province of the legislatures). 
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should be incarcerated because incarceration will rehabilitate 
them. Graham is not a departure from Tapia and Pepper in the 
end; it accepts their skepticism about the desirability of prison as a 
place for rehabilitation. It only says that a sentence to prison 
cannot be one that denies any hope that they will reform. 
Whether the odds of reform are high or (more probably) low is in a 
way beside the point. The state cannot by its sentencing rule out 
moral reform and release; this the model of rehabilitation as 
reform forbids. The rest, which is a lot (almost everything), is on 
the offender.2n 
C. APPLYING GRAHAM AND REHABILITATION AS MORAL REFORM 
Miller u. Alabama, the follow-up case to Graham that required
individualized sentencing for juveniles convicted of homicide, did 
not extend Graham very far. It did not strike down life without 
parole for juveniles altogether, as perhaps the logic of Graham 
dictated. 212 If states cannot make the judgment "at the outset" 
that juveniles convicted of gruesome and terrible nonhomicide 
crimes are "incorrigible" and ''beyond redemption," how does this 
change for homicide crimes? Instead, Graham focused on the 
possible disproportion between the culpability of juvenile 
murderers and life in prison without parole. 
In this regard, Miller is a case about the individualization of 
punishments in the (old) retrospective, retributive sense, and not 
in the prospective, rehabilitative sense.213 Youth is relevant in 
figuring out what the offender deserves for what he or she did, not 
because it may be relevant in predicting what he or she might 
become.214 Justice Kagan in Miller says almost nothing about the 
possible future rehabilitation of offenders. She is not worried 
about expressing the judgment that some juveniles will be beyond 
redemption, because some of them will be; that is, some of them 
211 Pushed to its limit, the logic of Graham leads to a kind of paradox. Graham says that
the possibility of reform in prison must be left open. A t  the same time, prison is a place 
where reform is very difficult. I return to this paradox in my conclusion. 
212 Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. C l  2455, 2463-64 (2012). 
2,a Perhaps not surprisingly, both Tapia and Miller were written by Justice Kngan. Tapia 
is hostile to extending punishment for rehabilitation; Miller hardly makes use of 
rehabilitation, mentioning i t  only in passing. See Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2468 (briefly noting 
that "mandatory punishment disregards the possibility of rehabilitation;. 
2u Id. 
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will really deserve to be in prison for the rest of their lives, and die 
in prison.210 She is worried, rather, that the state be certain that 
those who are sentenced to die in prison will be the right ones.216
Does Graham then lack any bite, any promise for real change? 
Miller suggests that it may and that even extending Graham to 
categorically prohibit life in prison without parole for juveniles 
convicted of homicide is not in the cards.217 Those juveniles who 
kill may indeed be fairly judged to be incorrigible at the outset, and 
be denied hope, although this will require an individualized 
finding. Nonetheless, we might speculate on some areas where 
Graham might have some influence even if (or because) 
rehabilitation means "rehabilitation as reform.'' 
1. Shorter and Lesser Punishments. If Miller suggests that the
rehabilitative ideal will not travel all the way upward to eliminate 
all punishments that impose life in prison without parole,218 there 
is still a possibility that it might affect some lesser sentences, 
including non-prison sentences. These sentences would be ones in 
which a judgment was made that the offender would neuer reform, 
no matter the remorse he felt or the efforts at atonement he made. 
Graham said that life without the possibility of parole entailed 
this judgment,219 but there may be other punishments that also 
imply incorrigibility. Based on Graham, these cases might also be 
candidates for cruel and unusual punishment, because they too 
would give up the rehabilitative ideal. 
211 See id. at 2469 (recognizing that a eentencer might still sentence a juvenile to life in
prison). 
211 Comparing Graham to Miller suggests a final way in which Graham subscribes to yet a
thud rehabilitative ideal, this time, rehabilitation BB treatment. Graham's ultimate
prescription for juveniles is not only an individualized sentence: i t  is an indefinite sentence 
subject to proof of rehabilitation. Of  course, the rehabilitation the Court in Graham is
interested in is the moral reform of the offender (his maturity, his remorse, and his 
atonement Crom reflection), and to a lesser extent, proof that the juvenile can reenter 
society as a productive and contributing member. I t  is not proof that the offender hes been 
"cured" of his antisocial "sickness," as the rehabilitation as treatment model held. Still, 
Graham says that i t  is only through rehabilitation that the juvenile offender can be 
released. Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 79 (2010). Until then, he or she must remain in 
jail indefinitely and possibly until death. 
m A t  least, in the short term. The logic of Graham on rehabilitation, I think, leads 
inevitably to the conclusion that all life without parole punishments for juveniles are
unacceptable. That Miller does not embrace this conclusion shows that the Court is not 
ready to extend Graham's logic. 
219 See supra notes 213-15 and accompanying text.
21, Graham, 560 U.S. at 72, 
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One possible extension of Graham (which may hardly seem an 
extension at all) is to apply i t  to sentences that are de facto life 
sentences. Graham read very narrowly would apply only to 
sentences of life without parole and not to sentences of years (and 
Justice Alita cautioned that this is all Graham should have been 
taken to mean 220) . But what of a sentence of one hundred years 
without the possibility of parole to a sixteen year old-isn't that the 
functional equivalent of a life without parole sentence? Or, to put 
i t  in terms of moral reform: does not such a sentence also make the 
judgment that the person is beyond reform? A California court in 
2012 was the first to rule that a sentence that allowed a sixteen 
year old a parole hearing only after 100 years was 
unconstitutional, finding that Graham applied to both ''life 
without parole or equivalent de facto sentences." 221 Other courts 
have followed; some have found even shorter sentences to be de 
facto life without parole sentences. 222 How to fix exactly how long 
is too long, however, remains an area of contention among state 
courts. 223 
Another, related extension of Graham involves lifetime 
punishments that do not involve incarceration. Consider a 
juvenile sex offender who is required to register for the rest of his 
life, where no showing of rehabilitation could ever be sufficient to 
remove the registration requirement. IT sex offender registration 
210 Id. at 124 (Alito, J., dissenting) ("Nothing in the Court's opinion afl'ecta the imposition
or a sentence to a term or years without the poHibility of parole."). 
221 People v. Caballero, 282 P.3d 291, 295 (Cal. 2012). 
222 Compare Floyd v. State, 87 So. 3d 45, 45-47 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2012) (holding that an 
eighty.year sentence, with the first opportunity for release at age eighty-five amounted to a 
life sentence), a11d Adams v. State, No. 1011-3225, 2012 WL 3193932, at •2 (Fla. Dist. Ct. 
App. Aug. 8, 2012) (holding that a sixty-year sentence with the ftrSt opportunity for release 
around age seventy-six amounted to a life sentence), with Bunch v. Smith, 685 F.3d 546, 
552 (6th Cir. 2012) (declining to apply Graham to consecutive, fixed-term sentences); State 
v. Kasie, 265 P.3d 410, 415 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2011) (same); Henry v. State, 82 So. 3d 1084, 
1089 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2012) (same), and Angel v. Commonwealth, 704 S.E.2d 386, 401-
02 (Va. 2011) (holding that a state statute permitting prisoners who are sixty or older and
who have served at least ten years of their sentence to petition ror conditional release 
provides the "meaningful opportunity for release" required by Graham). 
:w See, e.g., People v. Lucero, No. UCA 2030, 2013 WL 1469477, at •4 (Colo. App. Apr. 11, 
2013) ("Defendant argues on appeal that, statistically, 'serving 20 years in prison takes 16 
years off life expectancy,' thereby decreasing his natural life expectancy 'by about 32 years' 
before he becomes eligible for parole. According t.o his calculation, hia life expectancy is only 
forty-two years, and therefore the point at  which he obtains his first opportunity for parole 
exceeds that expectancy."). 
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is properly considered part of a punishment,224 then could a 
lifetime registration requirement also give up on the 
"rehabilitative ideal"? A court in Ohio found that a lifetime 
registration requirement did exactly this, although it focused more 
on how registries might make it harder for people to find work, or 
to integrate into the community.225 A clearer route might have 
been to note how the fact that the ban could never be lifted, no 
matter i f  there were proof of moral reform, was in fact a judgment 
that the offender would never reform, and that the state would 
always have to keep an eye on him. The problem with 
emphasizing the practical difficulties of reintegration is that it 
could plausibly be said that the original conviction was the 
problem, not the registration.228 I t  is better to hold that the state 
could not rule out ex ante the possibility of moral reform by such a 
sentence, however difficult it might be in practice. In other words, 
the problem with the rehabilitation as reform reading of Graham 
is not so much the obstacles to rehabilitation but the judgment the 
state makes at the outset that moral reform can never happen. 
Such an analysis might be extended to other, permanent 
disabilities offenders might face even after they are released-
bans that prevent ex-felons from voting for instance.227
22' See, e.g., Doe v. State, 189 P.3d 999, 1007, 1014 (Alaska 2008) (reasoning that a sex 
offender registry was "punishment" for purposes of the ex post facto clause analysis under 
Alaska constitution). 
226 See I n  re C.P., 967 N.E.2d 729, 743 (Ohio 2012) ("Finally, as to the final penological
goal-rehabilitation-we have already discuaaed the effect of forcing a juvenile to wear a 
statutorily imposed scarlet letter ea he embarks on his adult life. 'Community notification 
may particularly hamper the rehabilitation of juvenile offenders because the public sti g m a 
and rejection they suffer will prevent them &om developing normal social and interpersonal 
skil ls-the lack of those traits [hes) been found to contribute to future sexual offenses.'" 
(quoting Michele L. Earl-Hubbard, The Child Sex Offender Registration Laws: The 
Punishment, Property Depriuation, and Unintended Results Associated with the Scarlet 
Letter Laws of the 1990s, 90 Nw. U. L. REV. 788, 856-56 (1996))). 
228 See, e.g., Doe, 189 P.3d et 1011 (considering the argument that deleterious effects of 
registry ere attributable not to registry, but to the conviction for sex offense). 
221 See Richardson v. Ramirez, 418 U.S. 64, 57 (1974), where the respondents raised the 
rehabilitative ideal ea part of their argument: 
Pressed upon us by the respondents, and by amici curiae, ere contentions 
that these notions ere outmoded, and that the more modern uiew is that it 
is essential to the process of rehabilitating the a-felon that he be returned 
to his role in society Be a fully participating citizen when he has completed 
the serving of his term. 
ld. (emphasis added). 
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2. Prison Conditions. Above, I said that Graham does not
require that states provide rehabilitative training to juveniles; the 
most it requires is an opportunity far release. 228 There is a gap 
between the requirement of a "meaningful opportunity" for parole 
and any possible means to achieve that goal. This gap is 
problematic only i f  we think of rehabilitation as training; it is not 
as problematic i f  we think of rehabilitation as moral reform. 
Moral reform is in the end something the offender has to do on his 
own, by reflection and by atonement. Moral reform is nothing that 
a vocational or educational program can bring him to if  he does not 
want to be brought to it. In terms of actual, positive requirements, 
Graham and the moral reform model may allow states to get off 
the hook to a significant degree. 
What rehabilitation as moral reform may require is that prison 
conditions not be so degrading and dehumanizing that they also 
"send a message" that moral reform is impossible. Graham, in 
other words, may set a floor to what the state can and cannot do. 
What Graham prohibited was, at bottom, the "expressive 
judgment" by society that a juvenile was incorrigible.229 This 
message is sent by a sentence of life in prison without parole: it 
says, no matter how much you change, you are still irredeemable 
in society's eyes.230 But a life without parole sentence might not be 
the only way society might send such a message. Degrading or 
dehumanizing prison conditions might also express that judgment; 
they also might express to the offender that no matter how much 
he changes, society will nonetheless treat him as incorrigible and 
beyond redemption.231 Bad conditions, too, can deprive an offender 
of hope just as certainly as a lifetime prison sentence may. Here, 
we can give a deeper meaning to Justice Kennedy's statement that 
the prison system "itself becomes complicit in the lack of [the 
offender's) development"232 - not by depriving him of rehabilitative 
training, but by removing any possibility that prison is a place 
where he can be reformed, and where the judgment of 
22& See supra Part IV.A. 
2."t The message may be reinforced by a Jack of rehabilitative programs for the offender; 
but the message ia, in the first instance, conveyed by the punishment itself. 
230 Graham v. Florida, 660 U.S. 48, 74 (2010). 
u1 Id. 
m Id. at 79. 
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incorrigibility is "reinforced by the prison term."233 A s  one moral 
reform theorist put it, a punishment cannot aim at "degrading or 
brutalizing a person" because this is "not conducive to moral 
awakening but only to bitterness and resentment."234
In this way, Graham may relate to litigation against cruel and 
unusual prison conditions, and not just to litigation against other 
cruel and unusual sentences.236 Prisoners may not have a 
constitutional right to rehabilitation,236 but they may have a right 
not to be prevented from ever achieving moral reform by 
conditions which treat them as incorrigible and "beyond repair."237 
As Alice Ristroph has written, this "negative" holding of Graham 
"could lead to greater scrutiny of solitary confinement, security 
classifications, and other dimensions of prison conditions that 
render a sentence more severe without necessarily extending its 
duration."238 This is especially true if we treat rehabilitation as on 
a par with retribution as a purpose for punishment. For 
retribution, harsh conditions may be part of the punishment. 239 
But rehabilitation as moral reform may put a constraint on how 
harsh conditions can he: they cannot be so harsh that they in effect 
judge the offender to be beyond reform, because they make it 
impossible that he could ever reform.240
233 Id. 
� Morris, supra note 86, at 158; see also Mary Sigler, By the Light of Virtue: Prison Rape 
arid the Corruption of Character, 91 lOWA L. REV. 561, 604-06 (2006) ("[I)t is indecent to 
consign human being& t.o an environment where they are likely to be degraded . . . .  "). 
2:111 See generally LYNN S. BRANHAM, Cruel and Unusual Punishment, in CASES AND 
MATERIALS ON THE LAW AND POLICY OF SENTENCING AND CORRECTIONS 769 (9th ed. 2013). 
Z3a See Padgett v. Stein, 406 F. Supp. 287, 296 (M.D. Pa. 1975) (--i'he court rejects the 
contention that convicted prisoners have a constitutional right to receive meaningful 
rehabilitative treatment."); see also JOHN W. PALMER, CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS OF 
PRISONERS 222 (9th ed. 2010) (noting the refusal of courta to recognize this as a 
constitutional right). 
m Graham, 560 U.S. at 69 (quoting Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 598 (1977) {plurality 
opinion)). 
:2l8 Ristroph, supra note 14, at 77. 
2�9 See, e.g., Rhodes v. Chapman, 462 U.S. 337, 347 (1981) (recognizing that certain
conditions "are part of the penalty that criminal offenders must pay"). I do not think that 
this is the only--or the best-way of characterizing retributivism, as I detail in my article, 
Chad Flanders, Retribution and Reform, 70 MD. L. REV. 87 (2010). 
240 See IAN CRAM, A VIRTUE LESS CLOISTERED: COURTS, SPEECH, AND CONSTITUTIONS 154 
(2002) (describing conditions in overcrowded juvenile detention centers where children were 
"handcuffed to iron pipes for extensive periods" and concluding "(i]n short, the rehabilitative 
ideal was not realised in practice"). 
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But we should be careful, given the Court's past jurisprudence 
in this area and what it will accept as appropriately 
"rehabilitative.'' In Beard u. Banks,241 for example, the Court 
seemed to endorse (or at least refused to condemn) a prison plan of 
"rehabilitati[on] . . .  through deprivation,"242 in which misbehaving 
prisoners were deprived of magazines and other reading 
material.243 "Any deprivation of something a prisoner desires," 
according to the broader theory, "gives him an added incentive to 
improve his behavior."244 Such crude efforts at behavior control 
come close to being dehumanizing, to say nothing of their limited 
"rehabilitative" potential. And yet this is only the tip of the 
iceberg of harsh prison conditions which make surviving, let alone 
reforming, in prison barely possible.246 Indeed, under the guise of 
rehabilitation, prison may become harsher rather than more 
humane. 246 In the abstract, the ideal of moral reform may prohibit 
this; practice may be something entirely different.247 
3. Adults. In Roper, the Court emphasized how different
juveniles were from adults: in terms of their brain development, 
their susceptibility to influence by others, and most ambiguously, 
their lack of a fully formed "character."248 On the one hand, all of 
these things made juveniles less culpable for their crimes, a theme 
that also is present in Graham. 249 On the other hand, and this is a 
theme present in Graham but not in Roper, this state of 
"undevelopedness" might make juveniles more and not less 
capable of rehabilitation: they are not yet who they will be; they 
can mature, and by maturing, show that they are not inevitably 
what their crime might indicate them to be.260 They are better 
m 548 U.S. 521 (2006). 
2•2 Id. at 547 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
243 Id. at 526. 
244 Id. at 546. 
m It also shows the dangers of leaving it to legislatures to determine what rehabilitative 
programs work, for nothing in Graham prevents legielatures Crom presenting 
wrehabilitation through deprivation" as one oC the means or modes of realizing the 
"rehabilitative ideal." 
2,e Cf. Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 563 (1974) ("With some, rehabilitation may be 
best achieved by simulating procedures of a free society to the maximum possible exuint; 
but with others, it may be essential that discipline be swift and sure."). 
m See infra Part V. 
:41 Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 570 (2005). 
u, Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 68-69 (2010). 
uo Id. 
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than that, or rather who they are is not yet who they might be over
time, and through rehabilitation. By comparison, adults are who 
they are and so may be more culpable and, by the same token, less 
capable of future rehabilitation. Adults are to be punished; 
children are to be rehabilitated. 261 Juveniles, in the language of 
Graham, have a greater "capacity for change." 252 Adults and
children, from the standpoint of rehabilitation, are fundamentally 
different. 253 
But i t  is not clear that the contrast stands i f  we use the model of 
rehabilitation as moral reform, viz., that i t  will be easier for 
children to reform themselves, to reflect, and to show remorse for 
what they have done and harder for adults. Could not moral reform 
be equally possible for both of them? To be sure, i t  may be easier for 
some children and harder for some adults. But as a generalization, 
i t  seems wrong to judge children as always more capable of moral
reform and adults as always less capable. Some kinds of
sophisticated moral reform may even be impossible for children, 
that is, certain level of maturity may be necessary even to start the 
process of moral reflection. 254 Even a type of moral conversion 
seems possible for the most hardened of adults. More generally, 
contemporary moral reform theorists tend to insist that we should 
not treat any person "beyond civic redemption." 256 I f  this is right,
the rehabilitation as a purpose of punishment cannot be limited to 
sentences that involve juveniles. Whether a punishment leaves 
open the possibility of moral reform should be a constraint on all 
punishments: we should not give up on anybody. Again, what this 
entails may be very limited, at least in terms of the sentences i t  
251 Thie eeeme to be a fundamental premiee of the juvenile justice system. See, e.g., 
Carissa Byrne Hessick & Judith M. Stinson, Juveniles, S u  Offenses, and the Scope of 
Substantiue Law, 46 TEX. TECH. L. REV, 5, 9 (2013} ("The juvenile justice system was created 
over a century ago. The goal was to provide children, who were understood to be different 
from adults, with an opportunity for rehabilitation, rather than puniahment. When a 
juvenile commits what would be cla&&ilied as a crime i f  committed by an adult, that conduct 
is labeled 'delinquent,' and the juvenile justice system responds." (footnotes omitted)); see 
also In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 15-16 (1967) (Black, J., concurring) (noting that the belief that 
a child is "essentially good" means that a child is to be "treated" and "rehabilitated" rather 
than punished (internal quotation marks omitted}). 
:w Graham, 560 U.S. at 74. 
:w Id. at 79. 
u . Graham seems to acknowledge this. See id. (''Maturity can lead to that considered
reflection which is the foundation for remorse, renewa1, and rehabilitation."). 
256 Duff, supra note 95, at 186. 
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applies to. It may only apply to life in prison without parole 
sentences for juveniles or adults, because only that particular 
sentence expresses the judgment that the person is irredeemable.256 
V. CONCLUSION
Graham was decided long after the rehabilitative ideal had 
fallen out of favor. It had stopped, for the most part, acting as an 
ideal and became more of a side consideration to other, more 
"weighty" purposes of punishment such as retribution and 
deterrence. Graham does not, and cannot, by itself revive the 
rehabilitative ideal, and I have argued anyway that Graham's 
version of rehabilitation is rather modest. It does not entail any 
positive obligation on the state's part to rehabilitate the offender; 
it does not mandate any vocational or educational programs. It 
was decided against a backdrop of legislative and judicial hostility 
to the idea of prison as a place for rehabilitation, and it does not 
directly repudiate that hostility. Rather, it only says that society 
cannot pass the judgment that people will not rehabilitate 
themselves in prison. It has to hold out the hope, at least for 
juveniles, that they will be able to reform themselves while they 
are in prison. 
But Graham has, if only by the centrality of the concept of 
rehabilitation in its holding, put rehabilitation back on the agenda. 
It was, at the least, a relatively surprising development, although 
it remains to be seen what actual impact its emphasis on the hope 
of rehabilitation will have. There are some stirrings in the lower 
courts, but they are just that: stirrings. Nor has the decision led 
much in the way of sustained academic reflection on the 
"rehabilitative ideal."257 Moreover, we should not, I think, 
dispense with skepticism about the two problems that led many to 
discard the rehabilitative ideal. Identifying rehabilitation as 
l M  See William W. Berry Ill, More Different Than Life, Less Different Than Death: The 
Argument for According Life Without Parole its Own Category of Heightened Review Under 
the Eighth Amendment After Graham v. Florida, 71 OHIO ST. L.J. 1109, 1112 (2010). For one 
court's rejection of Graham's application to adults, see Commonwealth v. Batts, 66 A.3d 
286, 291 (Pa. 2013) (children are difi'erent ror purposes of  sentencing in Miller and 
Graham), 
1s1 But cf. Ristroph, supra note 14, a t  75-76 (analyzing Graham's relation to the 
rehabilitative ideal). 
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reform is one thing, and a necessary step; but endorsing it is quite 
another thing. 
First, we should consider whether rehabilitation as moral 
reform is a worthy ideal in itself. Should the state aim to have 
offenders pursue remorse, reflection, and atonement? Is this even 
a valid goal for a liberal state?258 Or should the state only 
imprison with a view towards deterring criminals and protecting 
society?269 Worries about manipulating offenders, to get them to 
believe the right things, plagued the model of rehabilitation as 
treatment. Similar worries might be raised about rehabilitation as 
moral reform, which displays an intense interest in molding the 
attitudes, emotions, and beliefs of the offender; in short, in shaping 
the offender's soul.260 Moral reform is something we might take up 
quo members of a religious community or a family; it may be less 
appropriate as a goal that the state pursues. 
Second, and perhaps more profoundly, we might still worry 
whether prison can work as a place for rehabilitation at all. 
Rehabilitation as reform removes the burden on the state to 
supply offenders with rehabilitative services; at least, it does not 
mandate them, although if they are present, the state cannot deny 
them to juveniles. I have suggested that rehabilitation as moral 
reform also should not condone brutalizing and degrading prison 
conditions: these, too, can express a judg m ent that an offender is 
"irredeemable." But is even this sufficient? Tapia, especially, 
displayed a profound skepticism-both legislative and judicial-
that prison could be at all compatible with rehabilitation.261 
Prison was not to be used for rehabilitation, period. Graham, by 
contrast, seems to depend on the idea that at least rehabilitation is 
generally possible in prison. This is not inconsistent with thinking 
prison is not the best place for reform, but it is in some tension 
with it. 
Suppose that we have good reason to doubt that even the best 
prison could be a place for rehabilitation as moral reform; suppose 
  I raised such a worry about Duff's philosophy o f  punishment in a review of one of his 
books. See Chad Flanders, Book Review, 113 ETHICS 149, 150 (2002) (reviewing DUFF, 
supra note 86). 
2511 See generally Chad Flanders, Can Retributfoism Be &wed1, 2014 BYU L. REV. 309. 
260 See, e.g., Duff, supra note 95, at 174 (contrasting liberal values with values that  (t)o 
put it crudely . . .  have to do with the soul, with our inner spiritual or moral condition"). 
211 See supra Part Ill.A. 
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we even thought that most of the time prison positively hinders a
person's project of moral reform. We would then be simply 
repudiating the vision of those who founded the penitentiary, and 
who thought that confinement and meditation could be a path to 
moral development and maturity, and who thought more generally 
that prison and punishment could cause one to reform. I f  we 
depart with the vision of prison as a place for moral reform, then 
we might think that the best thing for juveniles (and for 
everybody) is to find ways to keep them out of prison altogether, 
except when this was necessary to protect society. Giving up on 
this might mean giving up on the hope of moral reform in prison. 
But if prison is a bad place for reform in general, that was a false 
hope anyway. Deciding whether to extend Graham means, first,
deciding whether we should hold out that hope. 
